

John Morrill

STUART BRITAIN

A Very Short Introduction

OXFORD

Stuart Britain: A Very Short Introduction

VERY SHORT INTRODUCTIONS are for anyone wanting a stimulating and accessible way in to a new subject. They are written by experts, and have been published in more than 25 languages worldwide.

The series began in 1995, and now represents a wide variety of topics in history, philosophy, religion, science, and the humanities. Over the next few years it will grow to a library of around 200 volumes – a Very Short Introduction to everything from ancient Egypt and Indian philosophy to conceptual art and cosmology.

Very Short Introductions available now:

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Julia Annas	CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY Simon Critchley
THE ANGLO-SAXON AGE John Blair	COSMOLOGY Peter Coles
ANIMAL RIGHTS David DeGrazia	CRYPTOGRAPHY Fred Piper and Sean Murphy
ARCHAEOLOGY Paul Bahn	DADA AND SURREALISM David Hopkins
ARCHITECTURE Andrew Ballantyne	DARWIN Jonathan Howard
ARISTOTLE Jonathan Barnes	DEMOCRACY Bernard Crick
ART HISTORY Dana Arnold	DESCARTES Tom Sorell
ART THEORY Cynthia Freeland	DRUGS Leslie Iversen
THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY Michael Hoskin	THE EARTH Martin Redfern
ATHEISM Julian Baggini	EGYPTIAN MYTHOLOGY Geraldine Pinch
AUGUSTINE Henry Chadwick	EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN Paul Langford
BARTHES Jonathan Culler	THE ELEMENTS Philip Ball
THE BIBLE John Riches	EMOTION Dylan Evans
BRITISH POLITICS Anthony Wright	EMPIRE Stephen Howe
BUDDHA Michael Carrithers	ENGELS Terrell Carver
BUDDHISM Damien Keown	ETHICS Simon Blackburn
CAPITALISM James Fulcher	THE EUROPEAN UNION John Pinder
THE CELTS Barry Cunliffe	EVOLUTION Brian and Deborah Charlesworth
CHOICE THEORY Michael Allingham	FASCISM Kevin Passmore
CHRISTIAN ART Beth Williamson	THE FRENCH REVOLUTION William Doyle
CLASSICS Mary Beard and John Henderson	FREUD Anthony Storr
CLAUSEWITZ Michael Howard	GALILEO Stillman Drake
THE COLD WAR Robert McMahan	GANDHI Bhikhu Parekh

GLOBALIZATION
Manfred Steger
HEGEL Peter Singer
HEIDEGGER Michael Inwood
HINDUISM Kim Knott
HISTORY John H. Arnold
HOBBS Richard Tuck
HUME A. J. Ayer
IDEOLOGY Michael Freeden
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
Sue Hamilton
INTELLIGENCE Ian J. Deary
ISLAM Malise Ruthven
JUDAISM Norman Solomon
JUNG Anthony Stevens
KANT Roger Scruton
KIERKEGAARD
Patrick Gardiner
THE KORAN Michael Cook
LINGUISTICS Peter Matthews
LITERARY THEORY
Jonathan Culler
LOCKE John Dunn
LOGIC Graham Priest
MACHIAVELLI
Quentin Skinner
MARX Peter Singer
MATHEMATICS
Timothy Gowers
MEDIEVAL BRITAIN
John Gillingham and
Ralph A. Griffiths
MODERN IRELAND
Senia Pašeta
MOLECULES Philip Ball
MUSIC Nicholas Cook
NIETZSCHE Michael Tanner
NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BRITAIN Christopher Harvie and
H. C. G. Matthew
NORTHERN IRELAND
Marc Mulholland
PAUL E. P. Sanders
PHILOSOPHY Edward Craig
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Samir Okasha
PLATO Julia Annas
POLITICS Kenneth Minogue
POSTCOLONIALISM
Robert Young
POSTMODERNISM
Christopher Butler
POSTSTRUCTURALISM
Catherine Belsey
PREHISTORY Chris Gosden
PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
Catherine Osborne
PSYCHOLOGY Gillian Butler and
Freda McManus
QUANTUM THEORY
John Polkinghorne
ROMAN BRITAIN
Peter Salway
ROUSSEAU Robert Wokler
RUSSELL A. C. Grayling
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
Catriona Kelly
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
S. A. Smith
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Chris Frith and Eve Johnstone
SCHOPENHAUER
Christopher Janaway
SHAKESPEARE Germaine Greer
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
John Monaghan and Peter Just
SOCIOLOGY Steve Bruce
SOCRATES C. C. W. Taylor
SPINOZA Roger Scruton
STUART BRITAIN
John Morrill
TERRORISM Charles Townshend
THEOLOGY David F. Ford

Available soon:

THE TUDORS	John Guy	FUNDAMENTALISM	
TWENTIETH-CENTURY		Malise Ruthven	
BRITAIN	Kenneth O. Morgan	HABERMAS	Gordon Finlayson
WITTGENSTEIN	A. C. Grayling	HIEROGLYPHS	
WORLD MUSIC	Philip Bohlman	Penelope Wilson	
AFRICAN HISTORY		HIROSHIMA	B. R. Tomlinson
John Parker and Richard Rathbone		HUMAN EVOLUTION	
ANCIENT EGYPT	Ian Shaw	Bernard Wood	
THE BRAIN	Michael O'Shea	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
BUDDHIST ETHICS		Paul Wilkinson	
Damien Keown		JAZZ	Brian Morton
CHAOS	Leonard Smith	MANDELA	Tom Lodge
CHRISTIANITY	Linda Woodhead	MEDICAL ETHICS	
CITIZENSHIP	Richard Bellamy	Tony Hope	
CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURE		THE MIND	Martin Davies
Robert Tavernor		MYTH	Robert Segal
CLONING	Arlene Judith Klotzko	NATIONALISM	Steven Grosby
CONTEMPORARY ART		PERCEPTION	Richard Gregory
Julian Stallabrass		PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION	
THE CRUSADES		Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot	
Christopher Tyerman		PHOTOGRAPHY	Steve Edwards
DERRIDA	Simon Glendinning	THE RAJ	Denis Judd
DESIGN	John Heskett	THE RENAISSANCE	
DINOSAURS	David Norman	Jerry Brotton	
DREAMING	J. Allan Hobson	RENAISSANCE ART	
ECONOMICS	Partha Dasgupta	Geraldine Johnson	
THE END OF THE WORLD		SARTRE	Christina Howells
Bill McGuire		THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR	
EXISTENTIALISM	Thomas Flynn	Helen Graham	
THE FIRST WORLD WAR		TRAGEDY	Adrian Poole
Michael Howard		THE TWENTIETH CENTURY	
FREE WILL	Thomas Pink	Martin Conway	

For more information visit our web site

www.oup.co.uk/vsi

John Morrill

STUART
BRITAIN

A Very Short Introduction

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York

Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

Text © John Morrill 1984

The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)

Text first published in *The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain* 1984
First published as a Very Short Introduction 2000

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available

ISBN 0-19-285400-3

5 7 9 10 8 6

Typeset by RefineCatch Ltd, Bungay, Suffolk
Printed in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall

Dedication

For David Smith, my pupil in 1984 and my colleague in 2000, with
gratitude for all his friendship and loyalty

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

	List of Illustrations	x
	List of Maps	xi
	Introduction	xii
1	Society and Economic Life	1
2	Government and Law	17
3	The Early Stuarts	25
4	The Civil Wars	43
5	Commonwealth and Protectorate	54
6	Restoration Monarchy	61
7	Intellectual and Religious Life	77
	Further Reading	88
	Chronology	91
	Index	95

List of Illustrations

- 1 The title-page of *The English Farrier*, an agricultural tract of 1636 7
- 2 Design for a seed drill by John Worlidge, from *Systema Agriculturae*, 1669 8
- 3 Execution of the Gunpowder Plotters, print by N. Visscher 21
Courtesy of The British Museum
- 4 Portrait of Charles I on horseback by Sir Anthony Van Dyck, c.1637–8 32
Courtesy of The National Gallery
- 5 Portrait of William Laud, archbishop of Canterbury, after Sir Anthony Van Dyck, c.1636 35
Courtesy of The National Portrait Gallery
- 6 Portrait of Oliver Cromwell on the eve of his campaign in Ireland, 1649–50, by R. Walker 56
Courtesy of The National Portrait Gallery
- 7 Portrait of Barbara Villiers, countess of Castlemaine, mistress of Charles II, after Lely (date unknown) 64
Courtesy of The National Portrait Gallery
- 8 A pope-burning procession on 17 November 1680, commemorating the accession of Queen Elizabeth I 67
Courtesy of The British Museum

-
- 9 Portrait of James II by Sir Godfrey Kneller, 1684–5 71
Courtesy of The National Portrait Gallery
- 10 St Paul's Cathedral under construction (c.1690) 83
Courtesy of The British Museum

List of Maps

- 1 Major battles and sieges of the English Civil Wars, 1642–51 47

Introduction

The Stuarts were one of England's least successful dynasties. Charles I was put on public trial for treason and was publicly beheaded; James II fled the country fearing a similar fate, and abandoned his kingdom and throne. James I and Charles II died peacefully in their beds, but James I lived to see all his hopes fade and ambitions thwarted, while Charles II, although he had the trappings of success, was a curiously unambitious man, whose desire for a quiet life was not achieved until it was too late for him to enjoy it. Towering above the Stuart age were the two decades of civil war, revolution, and republican experiment, which ought to have changed fundamentally the course of English history, but which did so, if at all, very elusively. Whilst kings and generals toiled and failed, however, a fundamental change was taking place in English economy and society, largely unheeded and certainly unfashioned by the will of government. In fact, the most obvious revolution in seventeenth-century England was the consequence of a decline in the birth-rate.

Chapter 1

Society and Economic Life

The population of England had been growing steadily from the early sixteenth century, if not earlier. It continued to grow in the first half of the seventeenth century. The total population of England in 1600 was probably fairly close to 4.1 million (and Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, much more impressionistically, 1.9 million). By the mid-century, the population of England had reached a peak of almost 5.3 million, and the total for Britain had risen from roughly 6.0 to roughly 7.7 million. Thereafter, the number stabilized, or may even have sagged to 4.9 million in England, 7.3 million in Britain. The reasons for the rise in population, basically a steady progression with occasional setbacks resulting from epidemics before 1650, and the subsequent relapse, are very puzzling. The best recent research has placed most emphasis on the family-planning habits of the population. Once the plague had lost its virulence, a country like England, in which land was plentiful and extremes of weather never such as to wipe out entire harvests, was likely to see population growth. Each marriage was likely to produce more than enough children who would survive to adulthood to maintain the population. The rate of population growth was in fact kept rather low by the English custom of late marriage. In all social groups, marriage was usually deferred until both partners were in their mid-twenties and the wife had only 12 to 15 childbearing years before her. The reason for this pattern of late marriage seems to be the firm convention that the couple save up enough money to launch

themselves as an independent household before they wed. For the better off, this frequently meant delay until after several years at university, in legal training, or an apprenticeship of seven years or more; for the less well off a long term of domestic service, living in with all found but little in the way of cash wages.

This pattern continued into the late seventeenth century with even later marriage, perhaps because the real earnings of the young had fallen so that sufficient savings took longer to generate. At any rate the average age of first marriage for women seems to have risen by a further two years to over 26, with a consequent effect on fertility. More dramatic still is the evidence of a will to restrict family size. Steps were clearly taken in families with three or more children to prevent or inhibit further conceptions. For example, mothers would breast-feed third or subsequent children for many more months than they would their first or second child, with the (effective) intention of lowering fertility. Crude contraceptive devices and sexual prudence were also clearly widespread. Some studies of gentry families even suggest that celibacy became much more common (the massive growth of the navy may be partly responsible for this unexpected development!). In South Wales, one in three of all heads of leading gentry families remained unmarried in the late seventeenth century compared with a negligible proportion one hundred years earlier; while the average numbers of children per marriage declined from five to two and a half (which, given the high rate of child mortality, meant that a high proportion of those families died out). It is not known whether this was typical of the gentry everywhere or of other social groups. But it does graphically illustrate changing demographic patterns.

Consequences of Population Growth

The economic, social, and political consequences were momentous. In the century before 1640, population was growing faster than food resources. One result of this was occasional and localized food

shortages so severe as to occasion hunger, starvation, and death. It is possible that some Londoners died of starvation at the end of the sixteenth and at the beginning of the seventeenth centuries and quite certain that many did so in Cumbria in the early 1620s. Thereafter, famine disappears as a visible threat, in England at least. Increased agricultural production, better communication and lines of credit, and the levelling off of population solved the problem. England escaped the periodic dearths and widespread starvation that were to continue to devastate its Continental neighbours for decades to come.

A more persistent effect of population growth was price inflation. Food prices rose eightfold in the period 1500–1640, wages less than threefold. For most of those who did not produce their own food, and enough of it to feed themselves and their household with a surplus to sell in the market, it was a century of financial attrition. Above all, for the growing proportion of the nation who depended upon wage-labouring, the century witnessed a major decline in living standards. In fact, a large section of the population – certainly a majority – had to buy much of their food, and these purchases took up an increasing proportion of their income. It became a central concern of government to regulate the grain trade and to provide both local machinery and an administrative code, backed up by legal sanctions, to ensure that whenever there was harvest failure, available stocks of grain and other produce were made widely available at the lowest extra cost which could be achieved.

A growing population put pressure not only on food resources but on land. With families producing on average more than one son, either family property had to be divided, reducing the endowment of each member for the next generation, or one son took over the family land or tenancy while the others had to fend for themselves. The high prices of agricultural produce made it worth while to plough, or otherwise to farm, marginal lands hitherto uneconomic, but in most regions by the early seventeenth century there was little unoccupied land left to be so

utilized. The way forward lay with the more productive use of existing farmed land, particularly in woodland areas or in the Fenland where existing conditions (inundations by the sea or winter rain) made for only limited usage. The problem here was that the drainage of the Fens or the clearing of woodland areas was costly, had to be undertaken by those with risk capital, and had to be at the expense of the lifestyle, livelihood, and modest prosperity of those who lived there. Once again, government was forced to be active in mediating (or more often vacillating) between encouraging higher productivity and guarding against the anguish and protest of those adversely affected.


A growing population also put pressure on jobs. By the early seventeenth century there was widespread under-employment in England. Agriculture remained the major source of employment, but the work in the fields was seasonal and hundreds of thousands found lay labouring sufficient for part but not all of the year. Because, however, labour was plentiful and cheap, because most manufacturing relied exclusively on muscle power rather than a form of energy that would draw workers to its source, because raw materials walked about on, grew up out of, or lay dormant within the land, 'industry' in the seventeenth century took place in cottages and outbuildings of rural village communities. For some, especially in the metalworking and building trades, 'manufacturing' would be the primary source of income. For others, as in some textile trades, it could be a primary or secondary source of income. Textiles were by far the largest 'manufacture', with perhaps 200,000 workers scattered throughout England, above all in the south-west, in East Anglia, or in the Pennine region. It was a particularly volatile industry, however, with high food prices dampening the domestic market, and war and foreign competition sharply reducing foreign markets in the early seventeenth century. Tens of thousands of families, however, could not balance the household budget whatever they tried. Injury, disability, or death made them particularly vulnerable to a shortfall of revenue. There was chronic

'under-employment': a structural problem of too many part-time workers seeking full-time work.


To take just one example, at Aldenham in Hertfordshire, about one in ten households needed regular support from the poor rate but a further one in four (making over one-third in all) needed occasional doles or allowances (for example of fuel or clothes) to ease them through difficult patches. For a large number of families, achieving subsistence involved scrounging or scavenging fuel or wild fruit and vegetables and seeking periodic help from local charities or the rates – what has been called the 'economy of makeshifts'. One effect of the difficulties of rural employment was to drive large numbers of men and women into the cities – above all to London – where the problems were no fewer but rather more volatile. There was a large amount of casual unskilled labour in the towns, but casual work could shrink rapidly in times of recession or harvest failure. High food prices meant less demand for other goods and this in turn meant less scope for non-agricultural wages. Those who most needed additional wages for food were most likely to find less work available. Once more, the government had been drawn in to organize and superintend a national scheme of poor relief, and ancillary codes of practice governing geographical mobility, house building, and the promotion of overseas trade. Thus a growing population greatly increased the duties and responsibilities of the government – arguably beyond the Crown's resources and capacity. Those who produced and sold goods, those who could benefit from the land hunger in increased rents and dues, and those who serviced an increasingly complex and uncertain market in lands and goods (notably the lawyers) wanted to enjoy the fruits of their success; others looked to the Crown to prevent or to mitigate the effects of structural change. A dynamic economy is one in which government has to arbitrate between competing and irreconcilable interests. No wonder the Crown found itself disparaged and increasingly distrusted.

Agricultural Changes

By contrast, the late seventeenth century saw the easing, if not the disappearance, of these problems. The slight population decline in itself prevented the problems from getting worse. The upsurge in agricultural productivity was more important. The nature and extent of agricultural change in the seventeenth century is still much disputed. What is clear is that England ceased from about the 1670s to be a net importer of grain and became an exporter; indeed, bounties had to be introduced to ensure that surplus stocks were not hoarded. This remarkable turn-around may have been the result of a massive extension of the acreage under the plough – either by the ploughing of land not hitherto farmed or by land amelioration schemes. But it might also be the result of the introduction of new methods of farming which dramatically increased the yield per acre. By skilful alternation of crops and more extensive use of manure and fertilizers, it is possible to increase yields of grain and to sustain much greater livestock levels. Almost all the ideas which were to transform English agriculture down to the early nineteenth century were known about by 1660; indeed most of them had been tried and tested in the Netherlands. The problem is to discover how rapidly they were taken up. There was stubborn conservatism, especially among the yeomen; the good ideas lay mingled in the textbooks with some equally plausible ones which were in fact specious; the most effective methods required considerable rationalization of land use and some of them required high capital outlay. In the early part of the century, it seems likely that the most widespread innovations were not those which increased yields, but those which soaked up cheap surplus employment – especially ‘industrial’ cash crops that had to be turned into manufactures: dye crops, tobacco, mulberry trees (for silkworms). It was only when a falling population raised real wages and lowered grain prices that the impetus to increase productivity replaced the desire to extend the scale of operation as a primary motivation of the farmer. Changes in the way land was rented out also gave the landlord better prospects of seeing a return on the money he invested in land leased



1. The title-page of one of the growing number of self-confident agricultural tracts



2. John Worlidge's design for a seed drill was one of the many new mechanical aids promoted during the century. It was also one of the many not to work

out. The new farming probably consolidated the position established earlier by the simple device of increasing the acreage under the plough. Either way, government action in the grain market and the regulation of wages became far less frequent and necessary.

Trade and Manufacturing

In 1600, England still consisted of a series of regional economies striving after, if not always achieving, self-sufficiency. Problems of credit and of distribution hindered the easy exchange of produce between regions. Most market towns, even the large county towns, were principally places where the produce of the area was displayed and sold. By 1690 this was no longer the case. England had for long been the largest free trade area in Europe, and had the Crown had its way at most points in the century, the full integration of Ireland and Scotland into a customs-free zone would have been achieved or brought nearer. That it was not so owed most to the narrow self-interest of lobbyists in the House of Commons, especially in the 1600s and the 1660s. No point in England was (or is) more than 75 miles from the sea, and as a result of the schemes to improve river navigation, few places by 1690 were more than 20 miles from waterways navigable to the sea. Gradually, a single, integrated national economy was emerging. No longer did each region have to strive for self-sufficiency, producing low-quality goods in poor-grade soil or inhospitable climate. Regional specializations could emerge, taking full advantage of soil and climatic conditions – specializations which could then be exchanged for surplus grain or dairy products from elsewhere. Hence, the spread of market-gardening in Kent.

Exactly the same could be said for manufactures. One consequence of and further stimulus to this was a retailing revolution – the coming of age of the shop. The characteristic of market towns was the market-stall or shambles, in which the stall-holders or retailers displayed their own wares which they had grown, made, or at least finished from local raw

materials. By 1690, most towns, even quite small ones, had shops in the modern sense: places which did not distribute the produce of the region but which met the variegated needs of the region. The shopkeeper met those needs from far and wide. One particularly well-documented example is William Stout, who, in the 1650s, rented a shop in Lancaster for £5 per annum. He visited London and Sheffield and bought goods worth over £200, paid for half in cash (a legacy from his father), half on credit. Soon he was purchasing goods from far and wide and offering the people of Lancaster and its environs a wide variety of produce: West Indian sugar, American tobacco, West Riding ironmongery, and so on. Nonetheless, once towns became centres for the distribution of the produce of the world, people would tend to bypass the smaller towns with little choice and make for the bigger centres with maximum choice. This is why most seventeenth-century urban growth was concentrated in existing large market towns. The proportion of the population living in the twenty or so towns which already had 10,000 inhabitants rose sharply; the proportion living in the smaller market towns actually fell slightly. Some small centres of manufacturing (metalworking towns such as Birmingham and Sheffield, or cloth-finishing towns such as Manchester or Leeds, or shipbuilding towns such as Chatham) became notable urban centres. But the 20 largest towns in 1690 were almost the same as the 20 largest in 1600. All of them were on the coast or on navigable rivers.

Large Towns

Large towns, then, prospered because of their changing role in marketing. But many of them – and county towns especially – increasingly concentrated not only on the sale of goods; they began to concentrate on the sale of services. The pull of the shops and the burgeoning importance of county towns as local administrative centres, in which hundreds gathered regularly for local courts and commissions, encouraged the service and leisure industries. Gentlemen and prosperous farmers came to town for business or for the shops, and

would stop to take professional advice from lawyers, doctors, estate agents; or bring their families and stay over for a round of social exchanges linked by visits to the theatre, concerts, or new recreational facilities. The age of the spa and the resort was dawning.

Paris, the largest town in France, had 350,000 inhabitants in the mid-seventeenth century. The second and third largest were Rouen and Lyons with 80,000–100,000 inhabitants. In Europe, there were only five towns with populations of more than 250,000, but over one hundred with more than 50,000 inhabitants. In England, however, London had well over half a million inhabitants by 1640 or 1660; Newcastle, Bristol, and Norwich, which rivalled one another for second place, had barely 25,000 each. London was bigger than the next 50 towns in England combined. It is hard to escape the conclusion that London was growing at the expense of the rest. Its stranglehold on overseas trade, and therefore on most of the early banking and financial activity, was slow to ease; in consequence much of the trade from most of the outports had to be directed via London. In the seventeenth century the major new 're-export' trades (the importation of colonial raw materials such as sugar and tobacco for finishing and dispatch to Europe) were concentrated there. London dominated the governmental, legal, and political world. While rural England flourished under the opportunities to feed the capital and keep its inhabitants warm, urban growth was probably slowed. By 1640, 10 per cent of the population lived in the capital, and one in six had lived part of their lives there. By 1690 the richest 100 Londoners were among the richest men in England. No longer was wealth primarily the perquisite of the landed.

Migration

If goods moved more freely within a national economy, people may have become more rooted in their own community. Both before and after the Civil War, more than two-thirds of all English people died in a parish different from the one in which they were born. But both before

sample content of Stuart Britain: A Very Short Introduction

- [click The Pioneer Woman Cooks: Recipes from an Accidental Country Girl pdf, azw \(kindle\)](#)
- [download Edge of Dawn: A Midnight Breed Novel here](#)
- [download online Rockers and Rollers: A Full-Throttle Memoir book](#)
- [download Jesus Before the Gospels: How the Earliest Christians Remembered, Changed, and Invented Their Stories of the Savior pdf](#)
- [read Galapagos pdf, azw \(kindle\), epub](#)

- <http://conexdx.com/library/The-Secret-Life-of-Houdini--The-Making-of-America-s-First-Superhero.pdf>
- <http://wind-in-herleshausen.de/?freebooks/Cheesecakes.pdf>
- <http://ramazotti.ru/library/The-Art-of-Memory-Forensics.pdf>
- <http://econtact.webschaefer.com/?books/Born-That-Way--Genes--Behavior--Personality.pdf>
- <http://schroff.de/books/PC-Recording-Studios-For-Dummies.pdf>