

# POLITICAL AFFECT

CONNECTING THE SOCIAL AND THE SOMATIC



JOHN PROTEVI

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POLITICAL AFFECT



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*Connecting the Social and the Somatic*

John Protevi

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## Preface

THIS BOOK complements my *Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida, and the Body Politic* (2001). There, I used the notion of self-organization of material systems common in complexity theory, as well as the critique of hylo-morphism that Deleuze and Guattari develop related to that notion, as a reading grid for certain episodes in the history of Western philosophy. To provide a focus for that book, I developed a concept of the “body politic” to mark the intersection of the social and the somatic and used it in order to contrast Derrida and Deleuze on basic epistemological and ontological issues. Whereas *Political Physics* was primarily concerned with tracing the effects of that concept in reading the philosophical texts of others, here in *Political Affect* I pluralize the notion to that of “bodies politic,” and add to it several others (“political physiology” among them), with an eye toward using them in detailed case studies of the ways in which politics, psychology, and physiology intersect in socially embedded and somatically embodied affective cognition.

The notions of bodies politic and political physiology I develop here reflect a shift in contemporary philosophy, one I explored in *Political Physics*: the turn to a new, nonmechanistic materialism. As I argue at some length in that book, attaining the neomaterialist standpoint of Deleuze requires that we turn away from a postphenomenological stance in which the real is only a retrojected effect of entering signifying systems, a brute force that cannot be articulated but can appear only as a disturbance to a signifying field or to a consciousness. The rejection of that model of “force and signification” is complemented by the articulation of a Deleuzian neomaterialism that does not begin with consciousness (even a fragmented and internally hollowed-out consciousness) but which accounts for consciousness and for signification on the basis of a nonmechanistic and non-



deterministic materialism underlying historically variable subjectification and signification practices. Such a neomaterialism allows for a productive engagement with contemporary scientific findings and, most important, for a productive engagement with political practice, as I argued with Mark Bonta in *Deleuze and Geophilosophy* (2004). This book attempts to cash in on some of that promise.

I have learned from many discussions on these issues with Manola Antonioni, Miguel de Beistegui, Chris Blakely, Rosi Braidotti, Andy Clark, Jon Cogburn, Amy Cohen, Claire Colebrook, William Connolly, Dan Conway, Manuel DeLanda, Ros Diprose, Rich Doyle, Kevin Elliot, Fred Evans, Peter Hallward, Mark Hansen, Eugene Holland, Len Lawlor, John Marks, Todd May, Philippe Mengue, John Mullarkey, Jeff Nealon, Paul Patton, Dan Selcer, Dan Smith, Charley Stivale, Alberto Toscano, Alistair Welchman, Bertrand Westphal, and James Williams.

I am grateful to the organizers and audience members at conferences and departmental talks at which I presented various versions of these ideas: at Birkbeck, Cologne, Edinburgh, Dundee, Duquesne, Limoges, Memphis, Penn State, the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts (SLSA), the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), Staffordshire, Texas Tech, Trent (Ontario), Paris VIII, Vanderbilt, and Villanova. In writing this book I benefited from a summer research stipend from Louisiana State University's Council on Research; I am grateful for the extended study this grant allowed.

I am not a scientist or even a philosopher with much technical training in science, so I am very grateful that many people with those characteristics—among them, Alistair Welchman, Chuck Dyke, Ravi Rau, Phil Adams, and Vince LiCata—would help me with great patience and prompt replies. I thank them for their assistance and, as is the custom (and a good custom it is), resolve them of any blame for the clumsiness that remains.

I thank my research assistants, especially Ryanson Ku, Thomas Brasdefer, and Jane Richardson, and the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript, who provided many exceptionally penetrating comments. Roger Pippin was an excellent collaborator for part of what became chapter 6. The book was considerably improved by the comments of Cary Wolfe, series editor of *Posthumanities*, and Doug Armato, director of the University of Minnesota Press. More than that, it would not have been possible at all without their initiative.

Finally, along with my colleagues at Louisiana State University, I thank all my students who listened to what must have sometimes seemed mere rants as these thoughts came to me in fits and starts. I especially thank Robert Rose, who some time ago became a friend and colleague as well as a student.

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## *Introduction*

IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS, this book investigates the imbrications of the social and the somatic: how our bodies, minds, and social settings are intricately and intimately linked. I do this by bringing together concepts from science, philosophy, and politics. I call this perspective “political physiology” to indicate not only this mix of intellectual resources but also in order to indicate that subjectivity is sometimes bypassed in favor of a direct linkage of the social and the somatic. For instance, we see a direct linkage in politically triggered basic emotions, such as rage and panic, and in direct political/medical control of physiological processes—an intense form of biopower, to borrow Foucault’s term. I do not neglect the subjective level, however. In addition to treating instances in which the subject is bypassed, my treatment of affective cognition in social contexts also challenges both the exclusion of affect from cognition and the individualism of most treatments of the subject, insisting that subjectivity be studied both in its embodied affectivity and in terms of the distribution of affective cognitive traits in a population.

A central strand in the philosophy of mind has built up a picture of cognition as the emotionless capture and processing of information, that is, as representation. Today, however, some of the most interesting work in the field focuses on the role of emotion in cognition and/or challenges the notion of representation as the key factor in our knowing the world. It thereby challenges what we can call the “rational cognitive subject.” But even these two challenging schools—*affective neuroscience* and the *embodied-embedded mind*, respectively—tend to presuppose an adult subject that is supposedly not marked in its development by social practices, such as *gendering*, that influence affective cognition. As there are many different *gendering practices*—as well as an indeterminate number of other kinds of practices influencing affective cognition—I propose that we need

to turn to population thinking to describe the development and distribution of cognitively and affectively important traits in a population as a remedy to this abstract adult subject. In other words, to do philosophy of mind properly, we need to study the multiple ways in which subjects develop as a result of different social practices.

In pursuing this line of thought I develop three basic concepts—bodies politic, political cognition, and political affect—to examine the interlocking of the social and the somatic. The concept of bodies politic is meant to capture the emergent—that is, the embodied/embedded/extended—character of subjectivity, or in other words, the way the production, bypassing, and surpassing of subjectivity is found in the interactions of somatic and social systems. In bodies politic, the inherent relations of freedom and constraint, of individual and group, of subordination and hierarchy, make these systems amenable to political analysis; the regulation of material flows performed by these systems makes them objects of physiological study; and the triggering of qualitatively different feelings by those material flows, as well as the subtle negotiations of dynamic coupling of social emotions, makes them the object of psychological study. These networks of bodies politic are knitted together by the interlocking of processes that link the patterns, thresholds, and triggers of the behavior of the component bodies to the patterns, thresholds, and triggers of the behavior of the emergent superordinate (and sometimes transversal) bodies.

My analysis posits three compositional scales of bodies politic—personal, group, and civic—as well as three temporal scales—short-term, mid-term, and long-term. Borrowing concepts from Deleuze's ontology, which I will explain in chapter 1, on all these compositional and temporal scales, we see events as the resolution of the differential relations that structure a dynamic bio-social-political-economic field. These processes are crudely analogous to crystallization in a metastable supersaturated solution, with the important proviso that with bodies politic we are dealing with heterogeneous biological and social components. On the personal scale of political physiology, for example, we see the formation of a somatic body politic: the patterns and triggers of bodily action and reaction. On the group compositional scale, we see short-term events of concrete social perception and action, forming eventual bodies politic, or, perhaps less barbarically named, social encounters. Finally, on the largest scale of political physiology, we see the formation of a body politic in the classical sense, what we will call a civic body politic: the patterns and triggers of institutional action.

We must be clear at the outset that these compositional and temporal scales are only analytical categories and that all concrete bodies politic operate by the imbrications of all scales. In principle and in fact, all bio-social-political events enfold all levels of political physiology, as a concrete encounter occurs in a short-term social context between embodied subjects formed by long-term social and developmental processes encoded in social custom and (today) increasingly regulated directly and indirectly by processes of governmentality and biopower. More precisely, since context is too static, a bio-social-political event, like all the emergent functional structures of political physiology, is the resolution of the differential relations of a dynamic field, in this case, one operating at multiple levels: civic, somatic, and group. (Once again, we see here the limits of the crystallization analogy: crystals form in homogeneous solutions, while political encounters coalesce in heterogeneous environments.)

I develop these concepts from a variety of scientific and philosophical sources, of which I provide a sketch in chapter 1. Because I draw on so many fields, this is by necessity a synthetic and at times a speculative book, not a definitive one. I am trying to construct a plausible account that gives the outlines for and provides some examples of the field of affective cognition in bodies politic. In order to do so in a book of reasonable length, I cannot provide detailed arguments on many subpoints. Thus, in several places I select a certain position from among many, but I do not defend it against its specialist critics. This is both the better part of valor (no one person can be a specialist in all these fields) and a necessity to keep the narrative going. I do try in the notes to refer to the main issues at stake. With all these lines at work, I hope this book will appeal to philosophers trained in either the continental or the analytic tradition. To do that I need to explain the jargon and common references of each field in ways that threaten to bore the experts and alienate the novices. I can only ask for patience and open-mindedness from my readers to help me navigate this strait.

The book has three parts, which correspond to the theoretical and practical study of politically shaped and triggered affective cognition. As a bridge, I discuss the implicit political theology of some instantiations in the history of philosophy of concepts of the organism.

Part I, "A Concept of Bodies Politic," begins in chapter 1 with a survey of the scientific and philosophical works that enable me to develop my basic concepts. I show how we are led to rethink the dominant picture of the rational cognitive subject by advances in a number of fields: dynamical sys-

tems modeling, what is commonly called “complexity theory”; the ontology of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari; the autonomous systems theory proposed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela; developmental systems theory (DST), a new development in biological thought; new research on human emotion; and the situated cognition school in cognitive science. Together, these advances allow us to situate subjectivity in a network of natural and social processes and practices. We thus are led below the subject to neurological and physiological processes that at least condition subjectivity, if not void it altogether in extreme cases; here, in some of the findings of the embodied mind school, we see the basis for a careful discourse on human nature grounded in such basic emotional patterns as rage, fear, and protocpathic identification. We are also led above the subject in considering the way we are embedded in social practices that inform the thresholds and triggers at which those basic emotions come into play. Finally, we are also led alongside the subject to phenomena of teamwork and technological supplementation of subjectivity (the extended mind thesis).

In chapter 2, I put all the resources examined in chapter 1 together in laying out the interrelations of our three basic concepts of bodies politic, political cognition, and political affect. The following formula captures their interaction: politically shaped and triggered affective cognition is the sense-making of bodies politic. The concept of bodies politic is meant to capture the emergent—that is, the embodied and the embedded—character of subjectivity; the production, bypassing, and surpassing of subjectivity in the imbrications of somatic and social systems. Individual bodies politic are cognitive agents that actively make sense of situations: they constitute significations by establishing value for themselves, and they adopt an orientation or direction of action. This cognition is co-constituted with affective openness to that situation: affect is concretely the imbrication of the social and the somatic, as our bodies change in relation to the changing situations in which they find themselves. I trace the relations among compositional and temporal scales of bodies politic, insisting that we overcome the tendency toward individualist thinking and embrace population thinking about the effects of multiple subjectification practices, so that subjectivity is studied in terms of the distribution of affective cognitive traits in a population.

Part II, “Bodies Politic as Organisms,” has two chapters as well. Chapter 3 looks at Aristotle and Kant from the point of view of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the organism as a body politic locked into imposed stereotyped patterns of politically shaped and triggered affective cognition

produced by and in turn reproducing centralized and hierarchical social systems. In the mainstream of Western philosophy, the unity and teleologically ordered linality of nature as a whole and the organism as a microcosm of that unified whole have often been patterned on divine perfection and/or been brought about by God's plan. Deleuze and Guattari indicate the theo-bio-political register with their phrase the "organism is the judgment of God." In pursuing this reading, we must keep in mind that the organism in Deleuze and Guattari's sense is a hierarchically ordered body, a body whose organs are constrained to work for the benefit of the organism as an integrative and emergent whole that functions politically in the proper way, as determined by its role in a hierarchical social system. "Organism" is thus not a strictly biological term, but a term of political physiology, indicating the patterning of a somatic biological system by a hierarchical social system.

Chapter 4 examines Deleuze and Guattari's own treatment of the rigidly patterned organism and its counterpart, the "body without organs," which allows experimentation with patterns of bodily order. I provide readers with a guide to Deleuze and Guattari's somewhat bewildering terminology in order to clarify how the political genesis of capitalist subjectivity shown in *Anti-Oedipus* is placed into a naturalistic philosophy of great depth and breadth in *A Thousand Plateaus*. It was Deleuze and Guattari's work that led me to formulate the main concepts of the present work, and a detailed reading of their own conceptual formulations in the fields of political physiology and bodies politic will, I hope, show some of the roots, and hence untapped potentials, of this line of thought.

In Part III, "Love, Rage, and Fear," I examine three case studies of contemporary instances of politically shaped and triggered affective cognition as concrete imbrications of the social, the physiological, and the psychological. Again, it is vital to remember that although all compositional and temporal scales are active in all concrete cases, we can nevertheless identify one as most intense in each case. Thus, I examine the Terri Schiavo case in terms of the personal scale, the Columbine High School case in terms of the group scale, and the case of Hurricane Katrina in terms of the civic scale. Although I will develop a different emotional focus in each case (love in Schiavo, rage in Columbine, and fear in Katrina), to provide continuity across the analyses I concentrate on empathy as an important instance of affective cognition. Empathy—sometimes called, at least in its basic form, "emotional contagion," that is, an immediate emotional link between embodied beings—is biologically widespread, both in primates and



in humans. Although such a protoempathic identification capacity is widespread, it needs to develop and hence needs the right genetic background and social environment, and it is therefore not present in all. Furthermore, even if present, it is most easily triggered by those in the in-group: its extension to others is thus fairly fragile and can be overridden by such social factors as political indoctrination and military training, which manipulate thresholds for rage and fear. Therefore, protoempathic identification is an aspect of political physiology, and as such, it is biological, yet susceptible to political manipulation.

In chapter 5, I examine how political institutions directly invest the organic life of Terri Schiavo without regard to consciousness or subjectivity, rendering it a simultaneously undead and obscenely mediatized body. By a horrible twist operating at the personal scale, Terri Schiavo's parents are trapped in a pseudoempathy triggered by phenomena of faciality; their love then conflicts with the love that Terri had for them and for her husband and that led her to express her wish not to receive tubal feeding. In chapter 6, I examine how the killers in the Columbine High School massacre maintain a cold rage, initiating the act of killing yet staying in enough control to carry out their plans. Here we see the scale of group dynamics in which protoempathic identification is overcome by quasi-military training, a freelance experiment in political physiology on the part of the killers. Finally, in chapter 7, I look at how a racialized fear contributed to the delay in government rescue efforts in Hurricane Katrina until sufficient military force could confront thousands of black people in New Orleans; the government's racialized fear flew in the face of the massive empathy of ordinary citizens, a communal solidarity that led them to rescue their friends, neighbors, and strangers until they were forced to stop by government order.

Figure 1 expresses these relations among the case studies. To reiterate the essential point: all the compositional and temporal scales are involved in each of the case studies, but in each case a particular scale achieves a point of highest intensity. Although a punctual event occurs in all three cases (the cardiac crisis of Terri Schiavo, the attack by Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris at Columbine, the storm and flood of Katrina), it comes largely without warning in the Schiavo case; in addition, the developmental/training and geosocial historical timescales assume an importance in the other cases that is relatively muted in the Schiavo case. This intensity can be different in different cases. In chapter 2 for example, we will analyze a case, relayed in an article by Francisco Varcla, in which the compositionally per-

<b>composition</b>	personal	group	civic
<b>body politic</b>	somatic	transverse	governmental
<b>highest intensity</b>	Schiavo	Columbine	Katrina
<b>relation to subject</b>	below: subpersonal module	alongside: biotechnical assemblage	above: sociopolitical system
<b>timescale</b>	punctual event	habit/training	geosocial history
<b>emotional focus</b>	love	rage	fear
<b>technical focus</b>	medical/legal	military	geography

Figure 1. Relation of the compositional scale of bodies politic to various factors

sonal scale is most intensely marked by a mid-term developmental temporal scale, and the group compositional scale is marked temporally by a punctual event. Thus, we see the utility of the concept of *kairos*, or singular event, that gives us a heterogeneous time: some events are regular or ordinary, whereas others are singular, marking turning points in a system's history.

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*Part I* **A Concept of Bodies Politic**

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## *Chapter 1*    **Above, Below, and Alongside the Subject**

THE INDIVIDUAL AS RATIONAL COGNITIVE SUBJECT is a deep-seated presupposition of many strands of philosophy. In this picture, the subject gathers sensory information in order to learn about the features of the world; processes that information into representations of those features;<sup>1</sup> calculates the best course of action in the world given the relation of those represented features of the world and the desires it has (whether the subject is thought to be able to change those desires through rational deliberation or not); and then commands its body and related instruments to best realize those desires given the features of the world it has represented to itself. We thus see cognition placed between perception and action in what Susan Hurley memorably called “the classical sandwich model of the mind” (Hurley 1998, 401). For many philosophers, the rational cognitive subject is what we are, or at least what we should become: it is the epistemological standard by which our judgments are measured and the ethical goal for which we should reach, for we are enjoined to act the way rational subjects would act were they to be in our situation.

On the other hand, for many other philosophers—of more or less leftist political orientation—this notion of the subject is at best ahistorical and apolitical, an arid abstraction from concrete life and at worst a sham, a tool for use in political oppression: “We’re rational, you’re emotional, so just shut up and do as we say.” We can say that these philosophers go above the subject, locating it in a social field that at least constrains the field of its action but is often thought to more strongly constitute that subject through multiple and sometimes conflicting subjectification practices. To be more precise, as we will insist in chapter 2, above the subjective level we find a social field, itself multiple, which through its practices constitutes a field or population of subjects with varied affective and cognitive traits.

But it is not just politically active philosophers who call the rational cognitive subject into question. Recent approaches in cognitive science have squarely called into question the cognitivism of this picture of the subject and, to a lesser extent, its individualism. Philosophers have taken up these critiques of the individual cognitive subject in what they call variously the study of “embodied,” “embedded,” “extended,” “enactive,” and “affective” cognition: as a group, these philosophers can be said to pursue studies of 4EA cognition. Many of these critiques go below the subject to automatic, subpersonal, embodied cognitive and affective mechanisms. Many of these analyses, especially in studies of (socially) embedded and (technologically) extended cognition, also go alongside the subject to the immediately surrounding social and technical milieu or assemblage (this passage to the assemblage is what we will call transverse emergence). But, and this will be an important topic for us in chapter 2, the partisans of embedded and extended cognition rarely if ever thematize the social fields that structure and benefit from subjectification practices; that is to say, they rarely if ever submit to political analysis the fields within which different cognitive practices are developed, so I do not count them as going above the subject.

Bringing together the political and the 4EA critiques of the subject here, in *Political Affect*, I go above, below, and alongside the subject in examining politically shaped and triggered affective cognition: above to the social, below to the somatic, and alongside to the assemblage. In this endeavor I develop three basic concepts—bodies politic, political cognition, and political affect—to examine the interlocking of the social and the somatic; these imbrications sometimes, in the short term, bypass the subject and always, in the long term, constitute it. I develop my concepts from a variety of scientific and philosophical sources, each of which I will discuss later in this chapter: (1) the notion of emergence drawn from philosophical reflection on the scientific practices of dynamical systems modeling, what is commonly called complexity theory; (2) the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari; (3) the concept of autonomous systems proposed by the Chilean biologists and philosophers Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela; (4) the eco-social take on biology known as developmental systems theory (DST); (5) a hybrid theory of emotion drawn from a variety of psychological and neurobiological approaches, with a particular focus on protoempathic identification or “emotional contagion”; and (6) the 4EA cognition school of philosophical work in cognitive science.

## **Complexity Theory**

We have rich resources in complexity theory for overcoming individualism, especially the concepts of emergence and entrainment.<sup>2</sup> We should first note that working scientists do not use the term “complexity theory”; instead, they talk in terms of the mathematics used in modeling nonlinear dynamical systems. However, “complexity theory” does have some history of popular use, and it is considerably shorter to use than a more fully descriptive phrase. But its real utility for us is that it enables us to distinguish two fields within nonlinear dynamics: chaos theory and complexity theory. Chaos theory treats the growth of unpredictable behavior from simple rules in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems, while complexity theory treats the emergence of relatively simple functional structures from complex interchanges of the component parts of a system. In other words, chaos theory moves from simple to complex while complexity theory moves from complex to simple.<sup>3</sup>

To explain how complexity theory studies the emergence of functional structures, we need to understand three sets of linked concepts: (1) in the system being modeled—range of behavior, fluctuation, patterns, and thresholds; (2) in the dynamical model—phase space, trajectory, attractors, and bifurcators; and (3) in the mathematics used to construct the model—manifold, function, and singularity. A phase space is an imaginary space with as many dimensions as “interesting” variables of a system; the choice of variables obviously depends on the interests of the modeler. The phase space model is constructed using a manifold, an  $n$ -dimensional mathematical object. The manifold qua phase space represents the range of behavior open to the system. At any one point, the global condition of a system can be represented by a point in phase space with as many values as dimensions or degrees of freedom. If you track the system across time, you can see the point trace a trajectory through the manifold/phase space, a trajectory representing the behavior of the system.

For some systems, you can solve the equation that governs the function represented by that trajectory; for other systems, you simply run a computer simulation of the model and see what happens. Often these simulations will show trajectories following a particular configuration. These shapes of trajectories are called attractors and represent patterns of behavior of the real system. There are various kinds of attractors: point (for stable or steady-state systems), loop (for oscillating systems), and strange or frac-



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