

Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being

Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy



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Philip Tonner



Continuum International Publishing Group

The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane
11 York Road Suite 704
London SE1 7NX New York NY 10038

www.continuumbooks.com

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-4411-7229-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Tonner, Philip.

Heidegger, metaphysics, and the univocity of being / Philip Tonner.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN-13: 978-1-4411-7229-7 (hard)

ISBN-10: 1-4411-7229-7 (hard)

1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 2. Ontology. 3. Duns Scotus, John, ca. 1266-1308.
I. Title.

B3279.H49T59 2009

193--dc22

2009013821

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India
Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group

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Acknowledgements

The original idea for this book occurred to me while I was studying philosophy at the University of Warwick. I would like to thank all the members of staff and postgraduate students of the Department of Philosophy who made my time there enjoyable. Particularly, I would like to thank Miguel de Beistegui, Peter Poellner, Stephen Houlgate and Keith Ansell Pearson for their early encouragement and advice.

While conceived at Warwick, this text was written in Glasgow. I would like to extend my considerable thanks and warm gratitude to Alexander Broadie for his sustained help and guidance over the years. The argument of the present work has certainly benefited from his input. I would also like to extend my warm thanks to David Campbell, formerly of the Department of Philosophy at Glasgow. David kindly met with me to discuss some difficult points of interpretation and his comments on an earlier draft undoubtedly improved the text as a whole. Later comments from Brian Elliott and Richard Stalley have proven invaluable in improving the overall coherence of my argument. I owe both of them thanks for their continued support of my projects. I would like to thank Gerald Moore and Michael Nix, both of whom gave me helpful comments on aspects of the penultimate draft. I would like to thank Sarah Campbell and Tom Crick and the team at Continuum for their help and support with the final preparation of the manuscript. Of course, any errors or omissions in the book as a whole remain my fault.

I would like to extend my thanks to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, staff and students, for making my time there unforgettable. Particularly, I would like to thank Dudley Knowles, Philip Percival, Paul Brownsey, Robin Downie, Susan Stuart (now at HATII), Scott Meikle, Anne Southall and Susan Howel.

I would like to extend my warm thanks and gratitude to my family and friends, all of whom have made their contribution to my thought over the years. Particularly, I would like to thank my mum and dad, Jane and William, and my uncle Philip, for their continued support, patience and

encouragement throughout this and other projects. Also, I would like to thank our friend Bill Craw for his support throughout my studies.

Lastly, I would like to thank my partner Lynsey for putting up with me throughout this and other projects; this book is dedicated to her.

Philip Tonner
Glasgow
2009

Abbreviations of Heidegger's Works

- BPOP *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Trans. A. Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, 1988.
- BT *Being and Time*, Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1962.
- BT (2) *Being and Time, A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, Trans. J. Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, 1996.
- BW *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell, Routledge, 1978.
- DS *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, Trans. H. Robbins, De Paul University Chicago, Illinois, 1978.
- EGT *Early Greek Thinking, The Dawn of Western Philosophy*, Trans. D. F. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi, Harper and Row, 1975.
- EOP *The End of Philosophy*, Trans. J. Stambaugh, Condor, Souvenir Press, 1973.
- HCT *History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena*, Trans. T. Kisiel, Indiana University Press, 1992.
- ID *Identity and Difference*, Trans. J. Stambaugh, The University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- IM *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Trans. G. Fried and R. Polt, Yale University Press, 2000.
- KPM *Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics*, Trans. R. Taft, Indiana University Press, 1990.
- OTB *On Time and Being*, Trans. J. Stambaugh, The University of Chicago Press, 1972.
- PLT *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Trans. A. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971.
- QCT *The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays*, Trans. W. Lovitt, Harper Torchbooks, 1977.
- TMFL *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Trans. M. Heim, Indiana University Press, 1992.
- WIP *What is Philosophy?*, Trans. W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde, Vision Press, 1963.

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Introduction

General Introduction

Heidegger's philosophy is guided by one question: *what is the meaning of being?* Despite the fact that it was this question that stood out in antiquity as *the* question of philosophy, Heidegger holds that this question has been forgotten in modernity. Today we do not have an answer to this question and we are not even concerned about our inability to comprehend it. It was this question that Heidegger posed in *Being and Time* and that, in one way or another, guided his thought throughout his life.

In recent years much ink has been spilt trying to come to terms with Heidegger's thinking. Partly because of his style of doing philosophy, a style that goes back to the texts of past philosophers in the Western tradition and attempts to elicit what he calls the 'unsaid' from their works, coming to terms with his thought is, in an important sense, inseparable with coming to terms with the *entire* history of philosophy. In any attempt to do this, it is the problem of the meaning of being that must act as guide.

The result of the tradition of metaphysics, particularly the thought of Plato and Aristotle, has in Heidegger's view, become over the years calcified into what we now know generically as *the Western tradition of philosophy*. Since an adequate answer to the question of being is not to be found in this tradition we must, Heidegger maintains, reawaken our sense for the 'meaning of this question' and we must raise it once again. Our fate, as historically engaged agents who are sensitive to the meaningful world of things, is bound up with the fate of the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger attempted to reawaken our sense of urgency in the face of this question, together with raising the question itself, in *Being and Time*. This work constitutes the first stage of a life-long quest for an appreciation of the question of the meaning of being; all of his works are, in one way or another, intimately related to this question.

It is a matter of history that what has come down to us as the Western tradition of philosophy has been massively influenced by Aristotle's thought. Perhaps one of his most important insights was that there is 'a kind of

science whose remit is being *qua* being'.¹ Despite the fact that in the history of philosophy, from antiquity through medieval ontology down to the present, there has been an engagement with this science, nowhere, from Heidegger's point of view, has there been given a satisfactory answer to the question of the meaning of being. This is a problem for Heidegger since it is his conviction that all ontology, no matter how internally consistent and apparently useful its categories are, will persist visionless and corrupted from its *raison d'être* if it fails to clarify the meaning of being and to *understand this clarification to be its most fundamental task*.

The question of being must be elucidated adequately. Although 'being is always the being of an entity', 'it' is not itself an entity nor a class of entities. Rather, there is an *ontological difference* between being and beings. The question of being refers to being and not to beings. Nevertheless, Heidegger holds that in order to elucidate this question we must take an entity as a paradigm and make its being transparent. Since posing the question of being is a fundamental possibility of our being, it is appropriate that it is us, *qua* Dasein, that is rendered transparent. In fact, for Heidegger, the very posing of this question *is* Dasein's mode of being and Dasein receives its essential nature from being itself.

Heidegger agreed with Aristotle that the fundamental question of philosophy is the question of being. Since we use the predicative 'is' in many ways Aristotle searched for a unitary meaning of being that founded all of the various ways in which it is said. How can there be a unified sense or meaning of being when being is said in many ways? A concern with a unified sense or meaning of being was a major concern of Heidegger's and there is an affinity between his thought and Aristotle's, in so far as both thinkers, ultimately, open a *space* for the *univocity of being* to emerge as the proper expression of the meaning of being.

The Univocity of Being

My central aim in this book is to develop an interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy in terms of the univocity of being. Achieving this is impossible without reference to Aristotelian-scholastic substance ontology in general, and to the philosophy of John Duns Scotus in particular. Scotus raised philosophical univocity to its historical apotheosis. Minimally, the univocity of being entails that there is a fundamental concept or *sense of* being under which falls anything whatsoever that exists. Such a view plays a distinctive and crucial role in both Scotus's and Heidegger's philosophy.

For Scotus the univocity of being is expounded in terms of being's opposition to *nothingness*: all being is opposed to nothingness regardless of the determinations of being into infinite being and finite being. In Heidegger, the univocity of being emerges as the temporal configuration of being, understood as meaningful presence. Attributing the doctrine of philosophical univocity to Scotus is not controversial. With regard to Heidegger, things are more complicated.

Hitherto, univocity has not played an important role in Heidegger interpretation. On the face of it at least, this is significant because early in his career Heidegger wrote a book-length study on what he took to be philosophical texts of Scotus. To that extent, you might expect a brief discussion of this notion in the literature: but you would be disappointed. The word univocity rarely features in the index to translations of Heidegger's works, if it figures at all, and most scholars do not note univocity as a point of interpretation let alone discuss its significance to Heidegger's thought. This is not to say that interpreters of Heidegger's works have not come close to raising this question.

Significantly, Thomas Sheehan has interpreted Heidegger's text in terms of the *analogy of being*. Accordingly, his work will form an important point of reference. It is my view that, employing a Scotist move, analogy is impossible without a prior univocity. For Scotus, a fundamental sense of being as opposed to nothing underscores any further determination of that concept and for Heidegger time emerges as the horizon for the understanding of being. While different in important respects, both these views uphold a fundamental univocal sense of being and it is just this parallel that I shall have cause to explore.

Among the few exceptions to the rule of passing over the concept of univocity with reference to Heidegger have been the partial readings put forward of his thought by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* and by Allers in his 'Heidegger on the Principle of Sufficient Reason'.² For his part, Deleuze interprets Heidegger in terms of the thesis of univocity. On this reading, Heidegger 'follows Duns Scotus and gives renewed splendour to the Univocity of Being'.³ Part of my project here will be to gain a fuller understanding of what this statement means for the interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy of being. Doing this will involve discussing Heidegger's relationship to Duns Scotus and to traditional metaphysics more generally.

In recent years, the early Heidegger's relationship to Scotus has emerged as an area of novel scholarship in terms of the renewed interest in Heidegger's earliest philosophical engagement. As witness to this

there is the work of Theodore Kisiel, John Van Buren and John D. Caputo. The young Heidegger based his *Habilitation* thesis on what he took to be the work of Scotus and scholars have explored this area thoroughly. One consequence of this has been that Heidegger's relationship with Scotus beyond this text has remained largely unexplored. Whereas the attention paid to the early Heidegger's engagement with Scotus has remained largely within the confines of scholarly intellectual biography, my engagement will seek to place the entirety of Heidegger's thought in a critical relation to the univocity of being, and thus unavoidably, to Scotus.

Two initial questions are prompted by this approach: first, is the doctrine of the univocity of being explicitly significant for Heidegger? Second, even if being is univocal for Heidegger does his concept of univocal being have anything in common with Scotus's view of being? My answer to the first question is that univocity, while not explicitly thematized in his work, remains an implicit commitment and as such can serve as an interpretive tool for characterizing his philosophy. Howsoever Heidegger characterizes his philosophy of being explicitly; his concept of being is, implicitly, univocal. My answer to the second question is that while Scotus's and Heidegger's concepts of being differ radically from each other, they do nonetheless have something in common. That is, Scotus and Heidegger share a commitment to being having one prevailing sense. This is enough to characterize both philosophies of being in terms of univocity. Also, for both thinkers, albeit in different ways, to uphold univocity, implicitly or explicitly, is not a matter of opposing their doctrine to an alternative view that claims that being has a plurality of senses. For both thinkers, it is a matter of 'as well as' rather than 'in opposition to'.

I am pursuing univocity in connection with Heidegger because it has been suggested that Heidegger's view of being follows the path of analogy. While certain commentators have intimated that Heidegger's view upholds univocity, and so have begun to chart this territory, I propose to go all out after an interpretation of his thought that explores this notion. To be sure, Deleuze and Allers have been beacons of light in this regard, but neither has offered a sustained discussion of this theme. Allers, for example, affirms:

a . . . fundamental conviction which is, perhaps, never stated explicitly but is clearly basic to Heidegger's philosophy . . . [is that] . . . BEING is an univocal term.⁴

This remark when taken with Deleuze's pronouncement that Heidegger 'follows Scotus', motivates my project. I will be comprehensive in my

reading of Heidegger's philosophy and I will show the limit and extent of univocity in his thought. For this reason my concern with his very early work is subordinated to my larger aim of interpreting his text generally in terms of univocity. Given the importance of Heidegger's thought to contemporary European philosophy such a project is necessary. I will provide a reading of Heidegger's thought as a whole taking the thesis of the univocity of being as my point of departure. I will show that, from his beginnings in the Scotus dissertation through to *Being and Time* and then to his later critique of *representational thinking* and *ontotheology*, the thesis of the univocity of being, properly interpreted in terms that uphold being *as* meaningful presence, is a central guiding concern of his thought.

The Modern Predicament

Philosophical univocity, as present in Heidegger's text, entails a commitment to a kind of thinking without recourse to traditional ontotheological grounds. Philosophy is, and should be, committed to a certain form of *immanence*. It should not have recourse to a ground or foundation outwith 'experience'. To put this in Heideggerian terms, philosophy cannot base its program on any foundation beyond the epochal play of the concealing and revealing of being. All historical human beings are entitled to is their limited finite interpretations of things and any appeal to principles of order which, in one way or another, make a claim to atemporal universality, should be treated with a degree of suspicion and scepticism. It is this problematic that is at stake when Heidegger's thought is interpreted in terms of univocity. The univocity of being, as I understand it, implies immanence.

As such, philosophy contains within it a response to the condition of modernity, a modernity characterized by three coordinate concerns or circuits of interpretation, all of which take their point of departure from the conviction that 'metaphysics', broadly understood, has been and must be surpassed. Deleuze has listed three contexts within which this move has been made. They are, in his order: (1) The Death of God, (2) The Death of the Human and (3) other forms of thought.⁵

Modern European philosophy can be understood in terms of its point of departure. From a point of crisis, the death of God and/or the human, which amounts to a destabilization of traditional metaphysical points of departure, be they theological or humanist, modern European philosophers have attempted to oppose a novel response in terms of an 'other'

form of thought, not bound by the same fate as metaphysics. In Heidegger's case this new manner of philosophizing was initially phenomenology. Phenomenology represented a method by which Heidegger could answer *the* traditional metaphysical problem, the question of being. Later, with his non-representational thinking, which, from a biographical point of view, is the successor of phenomenology, Heidegger sought further to abandon any commitment to traditional metaphysics in order to think the event of the revelation of being to and for thought.

This issue of crisis and of 'thinking differently' connects with other currents in European thought throughout the 20th Century, particularly with philosophies that emphasize innovation and revolution in contradistinction to those that emphasize traditionalism and conservatism; the issue of the extent to which Heidegger abandoned conservatism in favour of innovation, or *vice versa*, shall be intimated in my discussion of his so called 'later philosophy'.

The death of God heralds for philosophy the abolition of the distinction between two worlds: one of being and the other of becoming and it heralds also the loss of any recourse to a transcendent ground that would provide the foundation for this temporal world of becoming. The death of God heralds the loss of the ultimate principle of order and source of all value in the universe that was prevalent in the metaphysical tradition. One response to this loss has been, reasonably enough, the substitution for God of another source of value and order. Historically, this has been the idea of humanity or 'the human', and this substitution has been bound up with the rise of consciousness and the birth of the *subject*.

From this point of view, the broadly Cartesian transformation of philosophy, whereby the subject is firmly at the centre of things, takes on a further significance. When, in modern European philosophy, the subject is destabilized as the source of meaning and value, the death of the human is intimated: the death of the human means that it is no longer possible simply to replace God with another idea. In principle, other replacements are possible, which would then act as the source of order and value in the universe, but such a move is, from the point of view of the post-traditional thinker, an illegitimate appeal to transcendence. Such a substitution does not require us to think differently, which is one of the central motifs of modern European philosophy. In effect, with the substitution of the idea of the human for God there has only been the substitution of one point of order and value for another and as Deleuze has put the point, 'finished is the belief in the substitution of humanity for God, the belief in the Human-God who would replace God-the-Human'.⁶ This is

the crisis of modern European thought. Without recourse to some transcendent source of order and value it may seem that the task of the thinker is insurmountable. How can one respond to this crisis? For Heidegger, this crisis is a crisis over metaphysics.

In his early thought Heidegger shows himself to be a methodological Nietzschean; philosophy, which *is* phenomenology, must remain atheistic. Later, Heidegger conceives himself as preparing the way for a return of the Holy. This is not the return of the Christian God, but it does herald the return of the 'divine' or the most high in human affairs. From Heidegger's point of view, the indifference to the divine and the Holy, which is characteristic of modernity, is something to be lamented rather than applauded.

Integral to Heidegger's response to modernity was the attempt to abandon the *will to power* which he took to be central to the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. The modern age of technology, which for Heidegger is modern humanity's way of relating to being, is the end product of modern subjectivism/humanism/anthropocentrism. In modernity, the general current of thought which asserts the Protagorean doctrine that 'man is the measure of all things' takes the form of the will to power: the unceasing attempt, individual or communal, to subordinate the earth to human control. Heidegger's response to the condition of modernity is bound up with a manner of thought that attempts to *let beings be*. Several consequences follow from this: particularly, Heidegger rejects philosophy, construed as metaphysics, and attempts to think non-representationally without recourse to metaphysical grounds. That is, he attempts to think *without why*.

One theme that I will return to repeatedly is Heidegger's thematization of death and finitude. It is his view that in the anticipation of death, being is revealed to Dasein. Now, in fundamental ontology Dasein is at the centre of Heidegger's ontological universe but Dasein is not the subject in the Cartesian sense. Heidegger's view is that, in anticipation of death, the way in which things can be meaningfully there or meaningfully present for 'you' becomes revealed. Being is nothing less than the meaningful presence which things can have for a Dasein or for a community. Death is that fundamental non-relational certainty which serves to individualize the Dasein in its concrete existence. In this fundamental experience being, in its univocity as meaningful presence, is revealed. What things actually mean for a Dasein will of course be different, but, for the univocity of being to obtain in Heidegger's text, what is important is *that they mean something*. The univocity of being obtains at the level of meaningful presence, and this has a temporal connotation.

According to Heideggerian existential phenomenology, the individual is a practically engaged agent and, as confined by finitude and death, the life of the individual has a certain tragic essence. The individual's task in a world that precludes any recourse to a founding transcendence is one of coming to terms with the inherent finitude of existence and the inevitability of death. The finitude of existence and the inevitability of death *is* the tragic essence of existence. This fact, considered alongside the claim that being is revealed in the anticipation of death, provides the rationale for my repeated return to this theme. It may be that Heidegger's mature response to the meaningful world of things, that we *let them be*, is sensible; given our inherent finitude, the would-be master of the earth seems to be overplaying his hand.

Being, the meaningful presence which things can have for Dasein, is unified by care (*Sorge*). In *Being and Time* care is defined as 'ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)'. In section 65 of that text Heidegger reveals that the ontological meaning of care is temporality. Thus, when revealed ontologically, Dasein *is* its temporality. As he puts it: 'Dasein . . . *is time itself*'.⁷

Dasein's temporality is revealed as the transcendental horizon for the understanding of being. As such, *all* being is understood in terms of time. To that extent, being is *univocally* understood in terms of time and being itself is temporal. For Heidegger, the univocity of being in terms of time is *the* conception of being in his thought. In *History of the Concept of Time* (a text that Kisiel has called the phenomenological draft of *Being and Time*) Heidegger accuses Descartes of reformulating an analogical conception of being. As always, Heidegger's critique of previous positions centres around the two fundamental terms of his own thought, being and Dasein.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger takes up the various issues surrounding the Cartesian philosophy and finds weaknesses in its conception of being. The critique of the philosophy of analogy is an important aspect of Heidegger's thought and it is a problematic to which he returns throughout his career. It is my view that it is the univocal sense of being in terms of time that Heidegger will determine in his own terms, that functions as the guiding principle for his critique of the tradition of philosophy and the thought of being in terms of analogy alone. From Heidegger's point of view, all previous philosophers have passed over both his sense of being as meaningful presence and his understanding of the being who understands being, Dasein. In what follows, I will explore Heidegger's critique of the tradition of philosophy in terms that allow the univocity of being to emerge in its proper place as an expression of his radical philosophy of being.

Heidegger came to employ the word *Ereignis*, which can be translated as the *event of appropriation*, rather than 'being' to name his central concern. This concern is the revelation of being *qua* meaningful presence together with the opening up of Dasein as finitude. This is a temporal event and being is revealed in the anticipation of death. Being may *essentially unfold as appropriation* but, as meaningful presence, it is still univocal.

Chapter 1

The Problem of Univocity in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

From Heidegger to Aristotle

The prelude to *Being and Time*, which is headed by a quotation from Plato's *Sophist*, inaugurates the question of being. From these passages it is possible to elicit two readings of the meaning of this question. Heidegger refers to the meaning of the word being and to a phenomenon of being. He is concerned with both. In spite of the importance of this question in the history of philosophy Heidegger notes that he faces three prejudices in his day against raising it again. He proposes to bring these to light at the outset of his enquiry. In the discussion of these prejudices the importance of Aristotle's philosophy of being for Heidegger emerges.

The three prejudices are: (I) being is the most universal concept; (II) as a concept, being is indefinable; and (III) as a concept, being is self-evident.

(I) Being is indeed the most universal concept but its universality is not that of a *class* or *genus*. The universality of being *transcends* the universality of a genus. Heidegger notes that in medieval ontology being was denoted as a *transcendens* in that it transcends the categories. He agrees with this, 'being is the transcendens pure and simple'. He notes that Aristotle put the problem of the unity of this transcendens on a new basis with his concept of the unity of analogy but notes that he failed to fully shed light on this problem. Hegel, who, for Heidegger, still looks to ancient ontology as his clue, no longer gives Aristotle's problem of the unity of being as over against the multiplicity of categories the place it deserves in ontology. The concept of being, despite its universality, remains the 'darkest of all' and we must discuss it further.

- (II) The prejudice of the indefinability of being is parasitic upon the prejudice of its universality. Being cannot be conceived as an entity and can never have the concept of definition in traditional logic applied to it. This is the problem of the ontological difference, the difference between being and beings. The fact that being is indefinable does not dispel the question of the meaning of being, nor does it mean that it is permissible to overlook this question. Rather, this indefinability demands that we face up to this question.
- (III) The prejudice of being's self-evidence is based upon the idea that when any thinking, speaking and comporting of oneself towards beings or one's self, the notion of being is made use of and is, therefore, intelligible without effort. But this, as Heidegger calls it, average kind of intelligibility, in fact demonstrates being's unintelligibility. In any comporting of oneself towards beings as beings there is *a priori* 'an enigma', for despite this pre-understanding of being the meaning of being is shrouded in darkness and so it is necessary to raise the question of the meaning of being again.

The centrality of Aristotle's problem for Heidegger emerges most clearly with regard to the first prejudice. Aristotle attempted to answer the question of the meaning of being and Heidegger notes that this put this question on a new basis. However, from Heidegger's point of view, Aristotle failed to satisfactorily deal with this question and this fact makes it necessary to raise the question of being again.

The question concerning being perplexed Aristotle from the time he wrote the *Categories* through to his mature works that were collected together under the title of *Metaphysics*. This problem is firmly in mind at the opening of the *Categories* where he begins with definitions of the notions of *homonymy*, *synonymy* and *paronymy*. What is at stake for Aristotle is far more than the meanings of words. Rather, Aristotle saw definition as a way to tackle and illuminate the metaphysical structure of reality itself. He is concerned with *things*, not words, and the definitions of homonymy, synonymy and paronymy apply to things. These notions are all intimately related to the ambiguous verb 'to be' and the ambiguity of this verb discloses a fundamental and profound fact about the structure of reality.

For Aristotle, things are homonymous if the same name applies to them but in a different sense each time. Things are synonymous if the same name applies to each in the same sense each time. Synonyms are thus susceptible of a general definition. Homonyms are not. For Aristotle, many philosophical terms were homonyms the most important of which is the

verb 'to be'. This scheme of homonyms and synonyms allows for particular things to be both homonymous and synonymous because there may be names that apply to both but in different senses and other names that apply to both in the same sense. From these definitions follow the definitions of *equivocal* and *univocal* terms corresponding to homonymy and synonymy respectively.

Paronymy is slightly different although it is, along with homonymy, another case in which things are said in many ways. Things are paronymous if their names are related in a certain way. Paronymous things are denoted by either the same name or a modification of that name and they are almost identical with regards to definition. This is so because both name and definition are related to some further thing in a *focal* way.

The second chapter of the *Categories* begins with a division of reality. Aristotle divides the 'things that are said' into those said *with* ('man runs', 'man wins') and those said *without* ('man', 'win', 'runs') combination. He then divides up the 'things that are' (beings) into four kinds. Whereas the first division seems to apply to subjects and their various acts, properties and relations the second is a division of reality itself by four. In the totality of beings (things that are) all are either predicable of (said-of) something or not and either inhere in (are 'in') something or not. With this schema there is the first hint of a division between the notions of universal, particular and the crucial notion of substance (*ousia*).

In the *Categories* Aristotle distinguishes between *primary substances* and *secondary substances*. Primary substances are the ultimate subjects of predication, they are individual particular things which are numerically one. Aristotle's examples are of an individual man and an individual horse. Primary substances are not said of a subject nor are they in a subject. Secondary substances are the things that are predicable of the primary substances but do not inhere in them. They are the classes or universals, species and genera which subsume particular existents. Aristotle says:

The species in which the things primarily called substances . . . [i.e. primary substances] . . . are, are called *secondary substances*, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man and animal – are called secondary substances.¹

Secondary substances exist in a less fundamental way than primary substances and could not exist without them. The remaining two divisions of the schema are occupied with non-substantial beings that inhere in substances.

Chapter three of the *Categories* introduces the transitivity of predication, the said-of relation. Thus, if 'P' is said-of 'Q' and 'Q' is said-of 'R' then 'P' is also said of 'R'. Applying this it is the case that if Socrates (primary substance) *is* a man (species) and man (i.e. if that species) *is* an animal (genus) then Socrates, by dint of his substantiality, *is* an animal (i.e. is a member of that genus) in addition to *being* a man (i.e. a member of that species). For Aristotle, the said-of relation is definitional of the individual particular thing. So, for example, an individual man is subsumed under the general definition of animal.

Species, by contrast with genus, reveals the *nature* of the individual particular thing. Each genus, provided that it is not subordinate to another, has its own particular set of *differentiae*; such as 'footed', 'winged' or 'aquatic' for the genus animal. The characteristic feature of substances and differentia is that 'all things called from them are so called synonymously'.² This is so since all the predicates they admit are predicable both of the individual particular things and of the species.

Synonymy is also involved when, in the said-of relation, a secondary substance is invoked in the definition of a primary substance since in such a case the primary substance is indicated by the name of their species. In contrast to homonymy and paronymy, which are both cases where things are said in many ways, synonymy is an example of things being said in the same sense of every thing of which it is said. Synonymy corresponds to univocity. This is important because Aristotle assumes a harmony between language and reality to the extent that synonymy and homonymy are properties of things. Thus, the order of being with which Aristotle is concerned with *exists* in a univocal way. So, when an individual particular man (Socrates) is defined by the secondary substance 'man' (species) he is being defined by the name of his species, with the strict definition of that species firmly 'in mind', and in so doing a space of univocity opens up between the different orders of being.

Chapter four of the *Categories* makes a return to the division between things that are said with and those said without combination. Those things said without combination comprise the famous list of the ten categories. These ten categories refine those things that are said (predicates) and give more information about the things that are (beings). They are, in effect, numerous ways in which a particular existent met with in our experience may be characterized. The ten categories are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. The first category of substance is rather different than the other nine. Substance is never 'in' anything else. The other nine categories, by contrast, are things that are

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