
C. G. JUNG

Essays on
Contemporary Events

*The Psychology of Nazism. with a New
Forward by Andrew Samuels*

ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY EVENTS
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NAZISM



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ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY
EVENTS

THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF NAZISM

C. G. JUNG

TRANSLATED BY R.F.C. HULL



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FOREWORD

By Andrew Samuels

'Well, I slipped up', said Jung to Rabbi Leo Baeck when they met in Zürich in 1946 for the first time since the Second World War (Jaffé 1971: 97–8). Jung was referring to the pre-war events surrounding his taking on of the Presidency of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy in 1933, an international professional body nevertheless based in Germany, dominated by Germans and, at that time, coming gradually under Nazi control. Further, Jung's papers of the period, dwelling on questions of differing racial psychologies and containing generalizations about Jewish culture and psychology, seemed then and later to be, at the very least, misguidedly published. For they could easily be misunderstood as supporting Nazi racial ideology.

For instance, Jews are said 'never to have created a cultural form of their own', but rather to need a 'host nation' for their development (1934). The implication of 'Jew as parasite' follows on easily. Similarly, Jews are referred to as 'physically weaker' than others, like women in relation to men (*ibid.*). Therefore they have developed subtle and indirect techniques of attacking other peoples (again, according to Jung, like women attack men!).

Jung's vigorous defence of his actions and protests over the real meaning of what he wrote have been buttressed from various quarters. Indeed, given the strength of negative feeling about his conduct, if such defence had not been forthcoming, the destruction of Jung's reputation might have been the result (*cf.* Harms 1946). Briefly, it can be shown that Jung did his best to protect the rights of Jewish psychotherapists by altering the constitution of the GMSP so that it became a fully and formally international body with membership units composed of national

societies and a special category of individual membership. Thus Jews, barred from the German national society, could retain their membership in the individual section.

Jung was also editor of the *Zentralblatt*, the Society's scientific journal. This was, to some extent, a *pro forma* appointment and Jung was geographically distant from the editorial offices. Therefore it is possible, or even likely, that he did not know of the pro-Nazi statement of principles which was inserted in the *Zentralblatt* by Professor Göring (a cousin of the Reichsmarschall) who had been made President of the (dominant) German section of the Society.

On a personal level, Jung never displayed features of anti-semitism. Many Jewish analysts studied under him, he performed numerous and risky acts of personal kindness to Jews during the war and, once the global negativism of National Socialism was apparent, he lent his pen and voice to its condemnation (Adler, personal communication, 1984).

And yet the shadow on Jung's reputation and thought remains. 'Shadow' is the apt word to use here, for it is one of the key conceptual terms in analytical psychology. The shadow, wrote Jung, is 'the thing a person has no wish to be' and yet, in some way, is (1946: para. 470). In other words, there is a negative side to every personality, his own included. One could go on to say, as Jung did, that for anything or anyone to have substance and worth, he, she or it would just have to possess a shadow. Crucial to the psychological processes brought into being by the shadow is its *integration* – not a harsh super-ego-led judgement of oneself, more a process of increased consciousness leading to self-acceptance and forgiveness.

It is my belief that this slim volume, published in German right after the war in 1946, represents a part of Jung's own attempt to integrate his personal shadow by pointing out (to himself?) that there is more to him and to his ideas than his detractors can admit.

How successfully does Jung negotiate his own shadow processes? An answer to this question must couple the speculations of psychobiography with a teasing out and objective assessment of Jung's conceptual and intellectual apparatus – that which he brought to bear in his engagement with the momentous events of the 1930s and 1940s. (We should not forget that there is a link between personality and thought, even when we distinguish them.)

That Jung had desires for leadership and behaved like the leader of a movement is still a contentious claim to make in analytical psychology. Indeed, the power aspects of the break between Freud and Jung are downplayed by both 'sides'. Jung was emphatic that he had no designs (like Freud's) to be a leader, was not interested in forming a band of 'Jungians', in spreading his ideas, or being active in the training of analysts. As I have tried to show elsewhere (1985), Jung displayed many of the features of a leader, sometimes maintaining his rule by dividing his followers, selecting individuals for special support, encouragement and advancement (often by writing Forewords for their books), and laying down rather tough criteria for the professional training of analysts. I concluded that Jung flattered his followers by maintaining that he did not want disciples; therefore no one who was involved with Jung could possibly be a mere disciple. It could be said that Jung relegated his leadership impulses and fantasies to his shadow. If so, then we may sense something psychological and personal to Jung in his keen interest in Hitler and the associated issues.

But we need more evidence before we talk glibly of Hitler as a shadow figure for Jung (that is, serving the function of carrying safely something about himself that Jung would rather not know). In the late 1930s, Jung was a prime mover in the drawing up of a list of propositions concerning the theory and practice of psychotherapy. The 'Fourteen Points', also known as 'Views Held in Common' (1938, par. 1072), were an attempt to *unify* the depth psychologies. We can see now that the seemingly inherent tendency of depth psychology to fragment made this a forlorn hope, practically speaking. But what are we to make of the use of a catch-phrase dating from the time of the formation of the League of Nations to characterize this effort? There is little doubt that Jung regarded his approach to analysis as *subsuming* those of Freud and Adler (e.g. 1929). Thus any 'Jungian' analysis would include the relevant features of an analysis of each of the other schools (though a stage of analysis known as 'transformation' was said only to be possible under the aegis of Jung's own approach).

Before all this is dismissed as grossly inflated fantasy on Jung's part, we should recall the idea that shadow and worthwhile substance are intimately linked. Alongside Jung's 'leadership complex', there is to be found a recognition of the value of other people's points of view and even a positive

evaluation of disagreement and dissent: 'agreement would only spell one-sidedness and desiccation'. We need many theories before we get 'even a rough picture of the psyche's complexity' (1945: para. 198).

We have been looking at some of the personal factors which led to Jung's 'slipping up' and, in particular, perhaps, to his expectation that the leadership offered to Germany by the Nazis could develop into something positive, a kind of awakening of German potential locked up in the 'German unconscious' (1934). This leads us to the next task, which is to assess the concepts and ideas which Jung employed.

The focus has to be on questions of racial psychology and the existence of a 'racial unconscious'. Jung's assumption that there are such things was, of course, consensual for the time. Jung's thinking is extremely difficult to follow, seemingly full of contradictions. If there is such a thing as a 'collective unconscious', meaning a level in the psyche which is common to all, then surely we would expect to see far greater homogeneity in human cultures than is in fact the case? In other words, does not the idea of racial psychology contradict that of the collective unconscious?

This would undoubtedly be the case if the evidence for and phenomenology of the collective unconscious is restricted to cultural forms and patterns: religion, family and kinship organisation, economic and social structure, etc. But this level of human ideation and performance is already far removed from what Jung usually means by 'collective'. (Though the fact that there are any similarities at all may be taken as evidence for the collective level coming through, as it were.) The truly collective aspect of the human psyche, which is what Jung refers to as the 'archetypes', is at one and the same time far deeper than the cultural manifestations just listed – and far more difficult to depict in words. For the level of archetype touches the psychosomatic bases of being human. Crucial to Jung's thought is the notion of the 'psychoid' layer of the unconscious: the most fundamental level which has properties in common with the organic world generally. The psychological and physiological worlds may be seen as two sides of a single coin. Thus, the psychoid nature of archetypes makes them the psychological equivalent of biological instincts. Hence the justification for the term 'collective'. (A further more technical point is that the

archetypes are indeed invisible, being only hypothetical structures; all we can experience is the manifestations of the archetypes.)

Having established the difference between the collective and the racial unconscious, we may now consider the value and truth of the latter idea. 'Value' and 'truth' cannot be separated when topics like race are discussed. If Jung had recognized this he might have indicated much more clearly which social and political implications of his ideas met with his approval or were in line with his thinking. I am not suggesting that ideas with potential dangers in them should be suppressed or withheld from publication, only that the whole context should be taken into account.

Is it true that Jews and Germans actually function completely differently, psychologically speaking? And is that what Jung is claiming? My position is that such a claim is probably not justified. *But Jung is probably not making that claim!* Here, as so often with Jung, it is the way in which his thought was somewhat in advance of his own time which causes the difficulty. That is, Jung is handicapped by the means he has available for the communication of his theories. We can discern the seeds of a surprisingly modern attitude to race and ethnicity.

In 1928 Jung argued against the imposition of 'the spirit' of one race upon that of another, explicitly referring both to a judgement of a non-European culture on the basis of European assumptions, and also to attempts by Europeans to behave as if they were part of another culture (e.g. India) (para. 240n). Jung is struggling to overcome a Eurocentric cast of mind. It could not be claimed that he was entirely successful in this, given the patent nonsense he writes about Judaism and also about so-called 'primitives'. With regard to the latter, there is a thoughtless conflation of (a) modern African adult with (b) modern European infant and (c) Neolithic beings. But there is also a deep respect for and interest in the evolution and development of differing cultures and this is apparent in the 'Wotan' essay in this book as well as throughout Jung's writings.

Jung got into difficulties with Jews and political commentators in the first place because of his claim and belief that depth psychologists have a duty and a competence to observe, describe and even interpret what is happening around them, beyond the

confines of the consulting room. Jung's feeling, expressed in his own Introduction to this book, was that in treating an individual an analyst is also 'treating' the whole culture from which that individual has sprung. Once again, we see a foreshadowing of numerous post-war socio-political critiques of the myopia of psychoanalysis when it refuses to take a position in relation to the events of the day. But there is more to Jung's desire to bring psychology to bear on culture than an interest in enhancing the healing power of individual analysis. He may also be seen as applying much of the methodology of individual analysis to cultural themes, such as the rise of Nazism (cf. Stein 1985). Note: this is a different enterprise from one which crudely employs the terminology of individual psychopathology to diagnose a cultural malaise – though subtle and enlightening variants of that can be and have been attempted. The parallel to be made is more with the practice of analysis. Jung strives to get into a transference-countertransference relationship with his 'patient' (in 'Wotan', it is Germany). Just as in individual analysis, this means allowing himself to be influenced by that which he seeks to 'treat' (countertransference). He tries to understand the behaviour of the 'patient' in terms of its antecedents (transference). Finally, he attempts to raise the level of the 'patient's' consciousness so as to allow the patient to regain a degree of self-control (interpretation). Each of these facets of the clinical analysis of an individual is employed in Jung's analysis of German cultural development, without reducing a whole country to the level of an individual.

In this short Foreword there is space only to focus on what I referred to above as 'transference' – the antecedent features of German culture, its earliest roots, its infancy even. For this is what Jung does when he introduces the figure of 'Wotan'. Germany behaves thus because, at a certain level, Germany has always behaved thus. Germany's past has an influence on Germany's present and unless the past can be opened up analytically it will continue to grip and shape the present.

So, returning to the earlier question: how successfully *does* Jung negotiate his own shadow processes? Nowhere in this book does Jung explicitly say that he too was caught up in the *Zeitgeist*; that he, too, became a devotee of Wotan; that he, too, had a 'problem' about Jews. But in the Preface to the book he refers to the 'violence' of the impact of world events on the

individual analyst. And in the Introduction Jung writes of the need to know that 'your worst enemy is right there in your own heart'. A definitive answer is, of course, impossible. I think Jung really did slip up, realized that, and tried to make amends.

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Preface

Medical psychotherapy, for practical reasons, has to deal with the whole of the psyche. Therefore it is bound to come to terms with all those factors, biological as well as social and mental, which have a vital influence on psychic life.

We are living in times of great disruption: political passions are aflame, internal upheavals have brought nations to the brink of chaos, and the very foundations of our *Weltanschauung* are shattered. This critical state of things has such a tremendous influence on the psychic life of the individual that the doctor must follow its effects with more than usual attention. The storm of events does not sweep down upon him only from the great world outside; he feels the violence of its impact even in the quiet of his consulting-room and in the privacy of the medical consultation. As he has a responsibility towards his patients, he cannot afford to withdraw to the peaceful island of undisturbed scientific work, but must constantly descend into the arena of world events, in order to join in the battle of conflicting passions and opinions. Were he to remain aloof from the tumult, the calamity of his time would reach him only from afar, and his patient's suffering would find neither ear nor understanding. He would be at a loss to know how to talk to him, and to help him out of his isolation. For this reason the psychologist cannot avoid coming to grips with contemporary history, even if his very soul shrinks from the political uproar, the lying propaganda, and the jarring speeches of the demagogues. We need not mention his duties as a citizen, which confront him with a similar task. As a physician, he has a higher obligation to humanity in this respect.

From time to time, therefore, I have felt obliged to step beyond the usual bounds of my profession. The experience of the psychologist is of a rather special kind, and it seemed to me that

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the general public might find it useful to hear his point of view. This was hardly a far-fetched conclusion, for surely the most naïve of laymen could not fail to see that many contemporary figures and events were positively asking for psychological elucidation. Were psychopathic symptoms ever more conspicuous than in the contemporary political scene?

It has never been my wish to meddle in the political questions of the day. But in the course of the years I have written a few papers which give my reactions to current events. The present book contains a collection of these occasional essays, all written between 1936 and 1946. It is natural enough that my thoughts should have been especially concerned with Germany, which has been a problem to me ever since the first World War. My statements have evidently led to all manner of misunderstandings, which are chiefly due, no doubt, to the fact that my psychological point of view strikes many people as new and therefore strange. Instead of embarking upon lengthy arguments in an attempt to clear up these misunderstandings, I have found it simpler to collect all the passages in my other writings which deal with the same theme and to put them in an epilogue. The reader will thus be in a position to get a clear picture of the facts for himself.

1

Introduction: the fight with the shadow¹

The indescribable events of the last decade lead one to suspect that a peculiar psychological disturbance was a possible cause. If you ask a psychiatrist what he thinks about these things, you must naturally expect to get an answer from his particular point of view. Even so, as a scientist, the psychiatrist makes no claim to omniscience, for he regards his opinion merely as one contribution to the enormously complicated task of finding a comprehensive explanation.

When one adopts the standpoint of psychopathology, it is not easy to address an audience which may include people who know nothing of this specialized and difficult field. But there is one simple rule that you should bear in mind: the psychopathology of the masses is rooted in the psychology of the individual. Psychic phenomena of this class can be investigated in the individual. Only if one succeeds in establishing that certain phenomena or symptoms are common to a number of different individuals can one begin to examine the analogous mass phenomena.

As you perhaps already know, I take account of the psychology both of the conscious and of the unconscious, and this includes the investigation of dreams. Dreams are the natural products of unconscious psychic activity. We have known for a long time that there is a biological relationship between the unconscious processes and the activity of the conscious mind. This relationship can best be described as a compensation, which

¹ [A broadcast talk in the Third Programme of the British Broadcasting Corporation, on November 3, 1946. First published in *The Listener* (London), XXXVI (1946), no. 930, 615–16.]

means that any deficiency in consciousness—such as exaggeration, one-sidedness, or lack of a function—is suitably supplemented by an unconscious process.

As early as 1918, I noticed peculiar disturbances in the unconscious of my German patients which could not be ascribed to their personal psychology. Such non-personal phenomena always manifest themselves in dreams as mythological motifs that are also to be found in legends and fairytales throughout the world. I have called these mythological motifs *archetypes*: that is, typical modes or forms in which these collective phenomena are experienced. There was a disturbance of the collective unconscious in every single one of my German patients. One can explain these disorders causally, but such an explanation is apt to be unsatisfactory, as it is easier to understand archetypes by their aim rather than by their causality. The archetypes I had observed expressed primitivity, violence, and cruelty. When I had seen enough of such cases, I turned my attention to the peculiar state of mind then prevailing in Germany. I could only see signs of depression and a great restlessness, but this did not allay my suspicions. In a paper which I published at that time, I suggested that the "blond beast" was stirring in an uneasy slumber and that an outburst was not impossible.²

This condition was not by any means a purely Teutonic phenomenon, as became evident in the following years. The onslaught of primitive forces was more or less universal. The only difference lay in the German mentality itself, which proved to be more susceptible because of the marked proneness of the Germans to mass psychology. Moreover, defeat and social disaster had increased the herd instinct in Germany, so that it became more and more probable that Germany would be the first victim among the Western nations—victim of a mass movement brought about by an upheaval of forces lying dormant in the unconscious, ready to break through all moral barriers. These forces, in accordance with the rule I have mentioned, were meant to be a compensation. If such a compensatory move of the unconscious is not integrated into consciousness in an individual, it leads to a neurosis or even to a psychosis, and the same would apply to a collectivity. Clearly there must be something

² Cf. "The Role of the Unconscious," in *Civilization in Transition*, par. 17.

wrong with the conscious attitude for a compensatory move of this kind to be possible; something must be amiss or exaggerated, because only a faulty consciousness can call forth a counter-move on the part of the unconscious. Well, innumerable things were wrong, as you know, and opinions are thoroughly divided about them. Which is the correct opinion will be learned only *ex effectu*; that is, we can only discover what the defects in the consciousness of our epoch are by observing the kind of reaction they call forth from the unconscious.

As I have already told you, the tide that rose in the unconscious after the first World War was reflected in individual dreams, in the form of collective, mythological symbols which expressed primitivity, violence, cruelty: in short, all the powers of darkness. When such symbols occur in a large number of individuals and are not understood, they begin to draw these individuals together as if by magnetic force, and thus a mob is formed. Its leader will soon be found in the individual who has the least resistance, the least sense of responsibility and, because of his inferiority, the greatest will to power. He will let loose everything that is ready to burst forth, and the mob will follow with the irresistible force of an avalanche.

I had observed the German revolution in the test-tube of the individual, so to speak, and I was fully aware of the immense dangers involved when such people crowd together. But I did not know at the time whether there were enough of them in Germany to make a general explosion inevitable. However, I was able to follow up quite a number of cases and to observe how the uprush of the dark forces deployed itself in the individual test-tube. I could watch these forces as they broke through the individual's moral and intellectual self-control, and as they flooded his conscious world. There was often terrific suffering and destruction; but when the individual was able to cling to a shred of reason, or to preserve the bonds of a human relationship, a new compensation was brought about in the unconscious by the very chaos of the conscious mind, and this compensation could be integrated into consciousness. New symbols then appeared, of a collective nature, but this time reflecting the forces of *order*. There was measure, proportion, and symmetrical arrangement in these symbols, expressed in their peculiar mathematical and geometrical structure. They represent a kind of

axial system and are known as *mandalas*. I am afraid I cannot go into an explanation of these highly technical matters here, but, however incomprehensible they may sound, I must mention them in passing because they represent a gleam of hope, and we need hope very badly in this time of dissolution and chaotic disorder.

The world-wide confusion and disorder reflect a similar condition in the mind of the individual, but this lack of orientation is compensated in the unconscious by the archetypes of order. Here again I must point out that if these symbols of order are not integrated into consciousness, the forces they express will accumulate to a dangerous degree, just as the forces of destruction and disorder did twenty-five years ago. The integration of unconscious contents is an individual act of realization, of understanding, and moral evaluation. It is a most difficult task, demanding a high degree of ethical responsibility. Only relatively few individuals can be expected to be capable of such an achievement, and they are not the political but the moral leaders of mankind. The maintenance and further development of civilization depend on such individuals, for it is obvious enough that the consciousness of the masses has not advanced since the first World War. Only certain reflective minds have been enriched, and their moral and intellectual horizon has been considerably enlarged by the realization of the immense and overwhelming power of evil, and of the fact that mankind is capable of becoming merely its instrument. But the average man is still where he was at the end of the first World War. Therefore it is only too obvious that the vast majority are incapable of integrating the forces of order. On the contrary, it is even probable that these forces will encroach upon consciousness and take it by surprise and violence, against our will. We see the first symptoms everywhere: totalitarianism and State slavery. The value and importance of the individual are rapidly decreasing and the chances of his being heard will vanish more and more.

This process of deterioration will be long and painful, but I fear it is inevitable. Yet in the long run it will prove to be the only way by which man's lamentable unconsciousness, his childishness and individual weakness, can be replaced by a future man, who knows that he himself is the maker of his fate and that the State is his servant and not his master. But man will reach

this level only when he realizes that, through his unconsciousness, he has gambled away the fundamental *droits de l'homme*. Germany has given us a most instructive example of the psychological development in question. There the first World War released the hidden power of evil, just as the war itself was released by the accumulation of unconscious masses and their blind desires. The so-called "Friedenskaiser" was one of the first victims and, not unlike Hitler, he voiced these lawless, chaotic desires and was thus led into war, and into the inevitable catastrophe. The second World War was a repetition of the same psychic process but on an infinitely greater scale.

As I have said, the uprush of mass instincts was symptomatic of a compensatory move of the unconscious. Such a move was possible because the conscious state of the people had become estranged from the natural laws of human existence. Thanks to industrialization, large portions of the population were uprooted and were herded together in large centres. This new form of existence—with its mass psychology and social dependence on the fluctuation of markets and wages—produced an individual who was unstable, insecure, and suggestible. He was aware that his life depended on boards of directors and captains of industry, and he supposed, rightly or wrongly, that they were chiefly motivated by financial interests. He knew that, no matter how conscientiously he worked, he could still fall a victim at any moment to economic changes which were utterly beyond his control. And there was nothing else for him to rely on. Moreover, the system of moral and political education prevailing in Germany had already done its utmost to permeate everybody with a spirit of dull obedience, with the belief that every desirable thing must come from above, from those who by divine decree sat on top of the law-abiding citizen, whose feelings of personal responsibility were overruled by a rigid sense of duty. No wonder, therefore, that it was precisely Germany that fell a prey to mass psychology, though she is by no means the only nation threatened by this dangerous germ. The influence of mass psychology has spread far and wide.

The individual's feeling of weakness, indeed of non-existence, was thus compensated by the eruption of hitherto unknown desires for power. It was the revolt of the powerless, the insatiable greed of the "have-nots." By such devious means the

unconscious compels man to become conscious of himself. Unfortunately, there were no values in the conscious mind of the individual which would have enabled him to understand and integrate the reaction when it reached consciousness. Nothing but materialism was preached by the highest intellectual authorities. The Churches were evidently unable to cope with this new situation; they could do nothing but protest and that did not help very much. Thus the avalanche rolled on in Germany and produced its leader, who was elected as a tool to complete the ruin of the nation. But what was his original intention? He dreamed of a "new order." We should be badly mistaken if we assumed that he did not really intend to create an international order of some kind. On the contrary, deep down in his being he was motivated by the forces of order, which became operative in him the moment desirousness and greed had taken complete possession of his conscious mind. Hitler was the exponent of a "new order," and that is the real reason why practically every German fell for him. The Germans wanted order, but they made the fatal mistake of choosing the principal victim of disorder and unchecked greed for their leader. Their individual attitude remained unchanged: just as they were greedy for power, so they were greedy for order. Like the rest of the world, they did not understand wherein Hitler's significance lay, that he symbolized something in every individual. He was the most prodigious personification of all human inferiorities. He was an utterly incapable, unadapted, irresponsible, psychopathic personality, full of empty, infantile fantasies, but cursed with the keen intuition of a rat or a guttersnipe. He represented the shadow, the inferior part of everybody's personality, in an overwhelming degree, and this was another reason why they fell for him.

But what could they have done? In Hitler, every German should have seen his own shadow, his own worst danger. It is everybody's allotted fate to become conscious of and learn to deal with this shadow. But how could the Germans be expected to understand this, when nobody in the world can understand such a simple truth? The world will never reach a state of order until this truth is generally recognized. In the meantime, we amuse ourselves by advancing all sorts of external and secondary reasons why it cannot be reached, though we know

well enough that conditions depend very largely on the way we take them. If, for instance, the French Swiss should assume that the German Swiss were all devils, we in Switzerland could have the grandest civil war in no time, and we could also discover the most convincing economic reasons why such a war was inevitable. Well—we just don't, for we learned our lesson more than four hundred years ago. We came to the conclusion that it is better to avoid external wars, so we went home and took the strife with us. In Switzerland we have built up the "perfect democracy," where our warlike instincts expend themselves in the form of domestic quarrels called "political life." We fight each other within the limits of the law and the constitution, and we are inclined to think of democracy as a chronic state of mitigated civil war. We are far from being at peace with ourselves: on the contrary, we hate and fight each other because we have succeeded in introverting war. Our peaceful outward demeanour merely serves to safeguard our domestic quarrels from foreign intruders who might disturb us. Thus far we have succeeded, but we are still a long way from the ultimate goal. We still have enemies in the flesh, and we have not yet managed to introvert our political disharmonies. We still labour under the unwholesome delusion that we should be at peace within ourselves. Yet even our national, mitigated state of war would soon come to an end if everybody could see his own shadow and begin the only struggle that is really worth while: the fight against the overwhelming power-drive of the shadow. We have a tolerable social order in Switzerland because we fight among ourselves. Our order would be perfect if only everybody could direct his aggressiveness inwards, into his own psyche. Unfortunately, our religious education prevents us from doing this, with its false promises of an immediate peace within. Peace may come in the end, but only when victory and defeat have lost their meaning. What did our Lord mean when he said: "I came not to send peace, but a sword"?

To the extent that we are able to found a true democracy—a conditional fight among ourselves, either collective or individual—we realize, we make real, the factors of order, because then it becomes absolutely necessary to live in orderly circumstances. In a democracy you simply cannot afford the disturbing complications of outside interference. How can you run a

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