

Changing Classes

STRATIFICATION AND
MOBILITY IN
POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES

Edited by

Gøsta Esping-Andersen



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Contents

Notes on Contributors	vii
Introduction <i>Gøsta Esping-Andersen</i>	1
1 Post-industrial Class Structures: An Analytical Framework <i>Gøsta Esping-Andersen</i>	7
2 Trends in Contemporary Class Structuration: A Six-nation Comparison <i>Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Zina Assimakopoulou and Kees van Kersbergen</i>	32
3 The Post-industrial Stratificational Order: The Norwegian Experience <i>Jon Eivind Kolberg and Arne Kolstad</i>	58
4 Class Inequality and Post-industrial Employment in Sweden <i>Michael Tåhlin</i>	80
5 Is There a New Service Proletariat? The Tertiary Sector and Social Inequality in Germany <i>Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Gianna Giannelli and Karl Ulrich Mayer</i>	109
6 Post-industrial Career Structures in Britain <i>Jonathan Gershuny</i>	136
7 Does Post-industrialism Matter? The Canadian Experience <i>John Myles, Garnett Picot and Ted Wannell</i>	171
8 Careers in the US Service Economy <i>Jerry A. Jacobs</i>	195
9 Mobility Regimes and Class Formation <i>Gøsta Esping-Andersen</i>	225
Bibliography	242
Index	253

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Introduction

Gøsta Esping-Andersen

This is a study of emergent class formation in six advanced societies. Using both longitudinal and cross-sectional labor force data, our chief intention is to examine the validity of the currently reigning views of social stratification in post-industrial society: on one hand, the rosy picture of a meritocratic knowledge-based class order; on the other hand, the gloomy scenario of a swelling service proletariat.

The six-nation comparison which we undertake has a dual motivation. First, the literature has a tendency to assume international convergence; we suspect substantial divergence across nations. Secondly, taking the lead from an earlier work, our theoretical argument is that contemporary social stratification is heavily shaped by institutions, the welfare state in particular.¹ If this is true, cross-national stratification patterns should systematically differ according to the nature of welfare states.

This book should not be read as if it were the final word on post-industrial social stratification. Indeed, serious and systematic research on the phenomenon has hardly even begun. Hence, the work presented in this book could be regarded as a provocation or as an invitation to others to join in. A project which addresses an unfolding, not yet clearly visible, process can hardly ever be precise, let alone definitive. The concepts of class and post-industrialism that permeate this volume remain, therefore, somewhat nebulous. We may be sharply aware that the parameters which defined to us the essence of high industrialism are being irreversibly recast, and we are to some degree capable of identifying the broad contours of an evolving new order. In brief, we live in an era of transition, and cannot pretend to know what will result once the embryonic structural components are cemented and institutionalized. After all, the reigning modern theories of *industrial* society were forged long after the fact. If we are still around twenty or thirty years hence, we might be able to do better than patching the usual 'post-' to our past. I wish to emphasize from the very outset that our use of the

2 *Changing classes*

terms 'post-industrial' and 'post-fordist' is purely heuristic. We also make liberal use of concepts such as the 'the service proletariat', again a matter of expediency.

Our agenda is both theoretical and empirical. Chapter 1 is an effort to construct a theoretical framework on the basis of which empirical analyses of post-industrial stratification can proceed. The aim is to hypothesize the driving forces behind the process of post-industrialism. Drawing liberally on the earlier insights of Jonathan Gershuny, I locate these in the recast nexus between households and work. In turn, I believe that the ways in which this nexus is recast depends on institutions in general, and on the welfare state in particular. Put somewhat differently, the core idea in this book is that we need an institutional theory of stratification.

The study of social classes often disintegrates into a battle of ideologies. This book is an empirical attempt to explore whether, and to what degree, post-industrial society promotes class closure. Whether classes exist is an open question, not a foregone conclusion. Just as none of the authors in this study is a sworn adherent to post-industrial theory, no one is dedicated to a particular class theory. The kind of open-ended approach we have chosen for this study could be criticized as naked empiricism. True, much of what we have done is to order and re-order the data in the hope of identifying whether or not there emerge the contours of a new class structure. But still, such an accusation would be unfair: unordered data will never reveal anything; our approach is to impose a preliminary theoretical scheme and examine its empirical validity. The second best to having a good and solid theory is to strive towards one. This is the chief purpose of Chapter 1.

Traditional class theory tends to be institution-less, assuming that classes emerge out of unfettered exchange relations, be it in the market or at the 'point of production'. Our study assumes the opposite. If the nexus of households and work is being revolutionized, and if the engines that generate employment function differently, it is because the labor market is now stretched between a set of towering institutions. Mass education, the welfare state and collective bargaining institutions were more or less unknown to Durkheim, Weber and Marx.

The impact of large institutions is difficult to discern in a one-country study. Maybe this is why most stratification theory fails to see them. We have chosen the comparative approach because this is the only means by which their influence can be gauged. Fortunately, the literature is saturated with comparative analyses of welfare states and industrial relations thus providing us with a solid basis for nation-sampling. From the point of view of maximizing institutional

variation, and taking into consideration the inevitable constraints of data availability and expertise, our choice fell on a comparison of Germany, Great Britain, the two North American countries, the United States and Canada; and two Scandinavian countries, Norway and Sweden.²

The research strategy was chosen by objective constraints. It would have been physically and mentally impossible for anyone to conduct systematic cross-national comparisons alone, even with the aid of a sizable army of research assistants. The data for each nation are complex and assume a particular expertise. For this reason we chose the research-collectivity option. With the aid of two intense workshops (both held at the European University Institute in Florence), a common theoretical and methodological formula, and concurrent back-and-forth communication, we have done our best to conduct and present the research as a unified and coherent whole. Still, no two authors are identical; the contributors use varying analytical techniques, and come to the project with their own unique sociological imaginations. We could not aim for strict comparability.

Chapter 1 serves to present the basic theoretical and conceptual framework for the subsequent empirical analyses. All individual nation-analyses address the same underlying questions and hypotheses, utilizing as far as possible the same concepts and classification system.³ The actual methodology of the nation-studies will differ; each country's data set stipulates to a large degree what is methodologically appropriate. Thus, the Norwegian study uses merged censuses for 1960, 1970 and 1980; the Swedish analyzes a panel constructed by merging surveys around 1980 and 1988; and the German study also benefits from long panels. In turn, the Canadian and US analyses were constrained by the unavailability of panel data that bridge more than two years. This heterogeneity of data sources, as well as the differences in years covered, obviously diminishes our capacity for sweeping comparative generalizations. The collaborating authors also employ different methodological techniques. Gershuny's study of Britain is, for example, an innovative and unorthodox application of time-budget analysis, while the other nation-studies generally utilize occupational mobility tables coupled with (typically) logistical regression analysis. Again, strict comparability is not possible but we are, nonetheless, convinced that comparative conclusions are warranted as long as we remember that the entire undertaking is meant to be explorative.

The empirical section of the book opens with a comparison of the evolving occupational structure in the six countries (Chapter 2). The aim is to highlight the chief differences in the nations' employment

4 *Changing classes*

structure so as to provide a framework within which the subsequent case-analyses can more easily be understood and compared. The evidence does confirm that countries cluster. The Scandinavian countries exemplify an extreme case of a gendered, welfare state service-led trajectory; Canada and the United States, in turn, are characterized by their large low-end consumer service labor market. Germany (and, to a degree, Britain) remains comparatively much more industrial and traditional in its employment profile. These differences can be traced to the impact of their respective welfare state and industrial relations institutions, and are important to keep in mind when evaluating the results from the individual case-analyses.

The individual empirical chapters are grouped according to the clusters that emerge in Chapter 2. Since the principal focus of the study is to explore post-industrial class closure, our choice was to center the analyses on the bottom and top of the post-industrial class hierarchies; we are therefore mainly concerned with the potential for a new post-industrial service proletariat, on one hand, and class closure within the professional 'knowledge class', on the other hand. The empirical chapters all present a rich and complex picture of class mobility patterns, some mainly emphasizing the issue of class closure at the bottom; others offering a more general analysis of class mobility. The results that are presented obviously do not condense into a neat and unequivocal finding. Common to all the countries is the degree to which the post-industrial hierarchy is gendered; the female bias is perhaps heaviest at the bottom, but permeates all the way to the top. This does not mean, however, that everywhere a dual gender-distinct class system is evolving.

There is clearly a 'Scandinavian model' insofar as the huge welfare state labor market generates a heavily gendered (female) mobility hierarchy, marked by a large share of unskilled service jobs. The tendency towards class closure is, however, not strong. The Norwegian study, in particular, emphasizes the upward mobility chances for the unskilled service workers; the Swedish, in contrast, suggests that mobility chances of unskilled service workers, while high, are not that different from mobility behavior in the traditional industrial order. This may very well be true, but there emerges nonetheless a strong commonality between Norway and Sweden: the emergence of a distinct, female-biased, career hierarchy in the welfare state.

This stands in sharp contrast to Germany. Here, unskilled service jobs emerge as largely dead-end careers, a closed secondary labor market that is, again, predominantly female. Unlike Scandinavia, these women's mobility chances are few, and low-end service jobs

seem to function mainly as a bridge between school and marriage. In Germany, the traditional skill divide that the vocational training system generates is pretty much replicated in the service occupations.

The British study is the one most explicitly concerned with class closure both at the bottom and top of the post-industrial hierarchy. Once again, this study illustrates how female-biased the new service economy is. The analysis hints at an emerging and quite intriguing paradox: while post-industrial society is open at the bottom, that is, not generating a closed proletarian service class, it is closing at the top. Gershuny suggests that education, rather than being the great social leveller, actually blocks mobility into elite positions for all but those with higher educational assets.

It is very tempting to contrast this conclusion with the German findings. Germany's labor market is typically regarded as unusually rigid due to its institutionalization of educational certification for access to good jobs. Yet Blossfeld, Giannelli and Mayer indicate that this kind of rigidity is prominent only at the bottom; at the top, mobility is quite high.

There is, finally, a great degree of commonality in the stratification patterns of Canada and the United States. Both chapters emphasize the openness within the bottom-end post-industrial occupations, but for reasons that diverge from other countries. In North America, unskilled service jobs tend to be very poorly paid, are predominantly filled by youth and immigrants, and function very much as first-entry, or stop-gap, jobs. These jobs do, however, also harbor a large reservoir of uneducated for whom upward mobility may remain very improbable. In both country-analyses a distinct low-end mobility circuit emerges which is unparalleled elsewhere: unskilled sales, clerical and service jobs appear to constitute a common job reservoir for people with low education, and for such people mobility may be very high but generally restricted within this circuit.

The final chapter in this volume (Chapter 9) attempts to pull together the comparative findings of our research. The heterogeneity of data, methods and analytical approach clearly prohibits the elaboration of a list of sweeping conclusions. Instead, this chapter seeks to generalize in the form of concluding hypotheses.

As editor and organizer of this project, I owe a great debt to the individual contributors, who have put an enormous amount of work into each chapter. The project received a great deal of help and encouragement from Karl Ulrich Mayer, Lee Rainwater and Aage Sørensen, all of whom have been essentially quasi-members of the group. I would also like specially to thank one of the anonymous

6 *Changing classes*

Sage reviewers. It is exceedingly rare to receive such a thoughtful, detailed and helpful set of comments. Had only he or she been a member of the group from the very start! Personally, I was heavily dependent on the research assistance and collaboration of Zina Assimakopoulou, Kees van Kersbergen and Ursula Jänicken. Unselfishly, they did all the hard work so that I could selfishly devote myself to the easy stuff.

Money is a very encouraging thing and I am very grateful that the Research Council of the European University Institute and the European Commission, Directory General for Social and Labor Market Affairs (DG V), were willing to encourage this study. I hope that the final product will not discourage either from continuing to pursue what is obviously a high-risk investment strategy.

Notes

- 1 In many ways this research project springs from the conclusions in Esping-Andersen (1990).
- 2 These represent the three basic welfare regime clusters identified in Esping-Andersen (1990): the United States and Canada are prototypical examples of the liberal model; Norway and Sweden of the social democratic model; and Germany of the conservative model. The United Kingdom was, in my earlier book, somewhat of a hybrid between the social democratic and liberal regime, leaning towards the latter.
- 3 Our classification scheme is based on three- or four-digit ISCO and ISIC codes and covers six nations. To avoid filling a third of this book with this kind of tedious detail, we refer interested readers instead to Assimakopoulou et al. (1992).

Post-industrial Class Structures: An Analytical Framework

Gøsta Esping-Andersen

Much of the discipline of sociology was built around the concept of social class. Today, its privileged analytical position seems less secure, and class analysis may even join the many anachronisms that our immature science has accumulated over the years. As witnessed by the recent, magistral study by Eriksson and Goldthorpe (1992), important studies of social class have certainly not been abandoned entirely. Still, it is symptomatic that Goldthorpe and Marshall (1991) have authored a follow-up paper entitled 'The Promising Future of Class Analysis', which, in large part, defends its relevance against the increasingly vocal skeptics.

However, the skeptics engaged in an active dialogue may be less of a problem than the much larger silent majority for whom the subject has become hopelessly unworthy of mention. The concept of class risks becoming little else than the button we press when it is suitable to invoke the colorful historical imagery of red banners waving on the May Day parades, outraged and sooty mineworkers huddling on the picket-lines, or members of a wild-eyed, revolutionary proletariat mass with patches on their best Sunday suits.

Ideological distaste undoubtedly motivates some to hasten the demise of class theory. But it is probably for its seeming incompatibility with modern social reality that most are partisan as regards its silent death. The notion of a class-ridden society may, today, seem quite moribund. But then so it has numerous times before. In the 1950s, the end-of-ideology thesis argued that the class struggle had been arrested by working-class affluence, only to be followed by the extreme levels of militancy and conflict in the 1960s. Then arose the problem of the new salariat, the ever-growing middle classes, and the professional elites. And now the old cornerstone of class theory, the industrial working class, is in rapid decline. The erosion of our traditional class structure is what many scholars associate with the coming post-industrial society.

Is post-industrial society the culmination of a long and steady

process of class structural erosion, or is it the midwife of an entirely new class system? In the voluminous literature on post-industrial society, there is probably no one who argues that inequalities and social stratification will come to an end. On the contrary. But the question is whether the emerging structure of employment, of life-chances and of inequality can be fruitfully understood with our inherited theories of class. The starting point of this book is that any attempt to address this question empirically should lay aside the classical conceptual apparatus of social classes.

Most of the literature that has emerged on the employment effects of post-industrialism shares two common features. One, virtually all such work assumes cross-national convergence, largely because of an exaggerated adherence to technological or growth-based explanations of change. Two, most approaches to 'post-industrial' stratification are couched in the classical conceptual apparatus of class. This means that our understanding of stratification in the 'new' society derives from theories formulated for the purpose of elucidating the era of industrial capitalism. Put differently, such analyses assume a fordist reality in a post-fordist era.¹

These features constrain both empirical research and theoretical innovation. First, it is not that technology and income growth are unimportant engines of change, only that their impact must be analyzed in terms of how they are institutionally filtered. The point is that similar technological innovations and economic growth take place in institutional settings that diverge. The advanced capitalist societies are regulated by institutions that hardly existed in the era of industrialization: the welfare state, collective bargaining systems, mass education and the modern corporation have emerged as important, if not decisive, institutional filters. Nations vary dramatically with regard to these regulatory institutions, and it is therefore naive to assume convergent trends in employment and stratification.

We should, secondly, question the continued fruitfulness of orthodox class theories. The idea of class in Marxism assumed a naked and unmediated relationship between capital and labor, be it in the labor market or in the workplace. Similarly, the Weberian legacy generally assumes market hegemony as the mainspring of life-chance stratification, although bureaucracy was viewed as an alternative, and, to Dahrendorf (1959), increasingly dominant, means of building social hierarchies. Regardless, orthodox class theory is nested in an institutionally 'naked' world, an Adam Smithian world of unfettered markets.

If, however, institutions not only modify employment relations but also actively shape the direction of change, continued adherence

to orthodoxy may seriously block one's capacity to identify qualitatively new axes of social division, hierarchy and social closure. In recent years there has, to be sure, been a flourishing debate on the 'new class', a debate that calls into question the validity of our traditional criteria for class assignment. Thus, in characterizing the distinctiveness of the 'new class', Bell (1976) emphasizes the control of scientific knowledge; Gouldner (1979), the control of culture; Goldthorpe (1982), delegated authority and the exercise of autonomy and discretion; Wright (1985), the control of skill and organizational assets.

While new principles for class analysis have been charted for the professional-managerial cadres, much less attention has been paid to the class structure in general, and to the possible evolution of a new post-industrial proletariat in particular. Is such a class emerging, and, if so, how do we identify it? What are its relations to other classes? What are its specific selection and reproduction mechanisms? And what are the conditions under which it may emerge? The objective of this chapter is, first, to develop a conceptual scheme for the analysis of social stratification in post-industrial society; secondly, to propose a set of hypotheses regarding cross-national divergence with particular address to the size and character of the potential post-industrial proletariat. These shall guide the empirical studies that constitute the core of this book.

Class and Stratification in Post-industrial Society

Post-industrial theory has its pessimistic and optimistic scenarios.² In Bell's (1976) pioneering work, post-industrial society is characterized by service employment dominance and the rise of professional-technical cadres, whose privileged social position is a function of their control of scientific knowledge and the means of information. Since meritocracy will emerge as the key criterion for assignment and privilege, Bell envisages a society in which the significance of deep class cleavages will erode. But then his analyses suffer from the lack of attention to the possible rise of a new underclass.

A rather parallel vision is presented in the more rosy literature on 'post-fordism' and flexibility. Here, however, the accent is on the ongoing transformation within manufacturing and its effects on skill upgrading, enhanced worker autonomy and authority, and on the decline of traditional fordist managerial hierarchies (Kern and Schumann, 1984; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Boyer, 1988).

There are essentially two pessimistic versions. One predicts that modern automation and technology will result in a workless

society, not far removed from the vision presented in Kurt Vonnegut's *Player Piano*. Gershuny (1978, 1983) argues that rising incomes will not produce a shift in household consumption towards services, but principally engender 'self-servicing' via purchased household commodities. Self-servicing creates demand for household goods that are predominantly material in nature. Thus emerges the paradox that the service society will mainly consume physical goods, and, as a consequence, it will not generate service employment. Moreover, since household capital goods, from video recorders to microwave ovens, are mainly produced in Japan, Taiwan or Korea, self-servicing will hardly promote domestic manufacturing employment in the post-industrial economies.

This kind of jobless growth is one logical outcome of the Baumol (1967) theory of unbalanced growth. His is an application of Engel's Law, but with a new twist: rising incomes will shift demand towards services, and enhanced manufacturing productivity will reduce the need for industrial labor. But, since service sector productivity grows much slower than in manufacturing, the end-result is a cost-disease problem: when wage costs in services follow those in manufacturing, service labor will outprice itself.

In the Baumol model, three outcomes are possible: first, the cost-disease may simply result in mass unemployment; the second possibility is that service jobs can be promoted via government-'subsidized' wages, primarily in the form of welfare state jobs; and the third possibility is that service employment will expand because of low wages that correspond to productivity differentials. The class structural outcome will differ sharply depending on which scenario is dominant, and it should be obvious that each one is institutionally dependent.

The jobless post-industrial scenario can be expected to engender a new kind of insider-outsider cleavage: a closed labor market of insiders enjoying high wages and job security (efficiency wages), and a swelling army of outsiders including youth, long-term unemployed, early retirees and discouraged workers. Jobs themselves may become assets on which the new distributional struggles will center (Van Parijs, 1987). The possibility that such an outsider underclass is evolving has been raised by Auletta (1982), Levy (1988) and Runciman (1990).³

The de-industrialization literature presents a second kind of pessimistic scenario. Instead of predicting the growth of an outsider population, the argument here is that industrial decline leads to a powerful downward pressure on wages coupled to mass proletarianization. Hence, the middle declines and the labor market polarizes between the top and the new swelling bottom. Drawing on

dual labor market theory, Giddens (1973) also sees the possibility of such polarization with, at the bottom, a new underclass (heavily weighted by women and minorities), trapped into a vicious cycle of underprivilege. A rather similar model is found in the pessimistic variant of the flexibility literature. Piore and Sabel (1984) suggest the possibility of a 'Napoli model' of flexibilization where firms combine their highly qualified internal labor force with a periphery pool of labor reserves. The implication is that post-industrialization *with* wage flexibility (read low wages) generates a new underclass of marginals and stand-by workers in the labor market, what Michon (1981) and Goldthorpe (1990) call 'disponibles.'

The Problem of 'Classes'

Our dominant class theories, be they Marxist or Weberian, identify classes with reference to the axis of ownership, authority or the naked market nexus of industrial capitalism. Along these axes we are presented with a distribution of the *male* workforce; the class membership of women, whether employed or not, is largely defined as an adjunct to the male. Yet one of the revolutionizing characteristics of the post-industrial order is its potential for exploding the traditional class-gender nexus. A lion's share of post-industrial jobs are freed of any natural male bias, many may actually harbor a female bias and, as we shall argue, inherent in the passage towards the service society lies the prospect of a fundamental break with the conventional female life/career-cycle. The constraints on women's capacity to throw themselves into full-fledged career trajectories are sharply reduced. Therefore, seen from both the demand and supply side, it is very possible that the emerging post-industrial labor market will be synonymous with a female labor market (Clement and Myles, 1994). In this section, we shall first address the principles of a post-industrial class conceptualization and, secondly, attempt to integrate the role of women theoretically.

The Construction of a Post-industrial Class Scheme

Marxist theory has been an especially stubborn witness to the transformations of advanced capitalism. A typical example is Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich's (1979) attempt to rescue Marxism by asserting that the new managerial and professional classes, like Renner's service class, were little else than an additional (unproductive) layer in the reproductive logic of capitalist class relations, the key axis still being workers and capitalists.⁴ Similarly, it hardly adds much to our understanding of the huge white-collar stratum to force it into the manual proletarian class, as orthodox Marxists still insist on doing (Sobel, 1989).

A much more ambitious and coherent theoretical salvage was attempted in Eric Wright's (1978, 1979) early work. Yet, his solution, to classify the huge number of positions that fall outside the strict class domination axis as semi-autonomous or contradictory locations, was aborted. It is symptomatic that Wright's (1985, 1989) revised class schema, now built around the control and exploitation of assets (ownership, organizational and skills), converges with the Weberian scheme. The labels may differ, but Wright's new class map is only marginally at variance with that of Goldthorpe (1987) or Runciman (1990). Indeed, his 'expert class' is virtually synonymous with Goldthorpe's service class or, for that matter, Gouldner's or Bell's knowledge class.

Those inspired by the Weberian tradition have been more inclined towards theoretical revision. This is to be expected given the much greater flexibility inherent in its standard definition of class: 'classes exist to the extent that groups share a common market condition as the decisive basis for their specific life-chances' (Mayer and Carroll, 1987: 16).⁵ In this framework, it is easy to recognize that the burgeoning professional, managerial and executive elites constitute new strata with rather unique life-chances that arise out of a common market condition. Still, the Weberian reformulations also remain unsatisfactory from the point of view of post-industrial society. Their principal shortcoming is a failure to recognize that the 'post-fordist' division of labor may give birth to new axes of stratification.

We propose in the following a tentative 'class scheme' whose principal aim is to distinguish post-industrial from the traditional fordist classes or, if you like, strata. We employ two kinds of criterion that, in our view, are likely to apply differently. The first is essentially a horizontal one: how is a given kind of job inserted in the overall division of labor? The second is dynamic and tries to capture the likelihood of class closure; what we might call life-chance or career regimes.

The New Division of Labor

Most contemporary research follows Gouldner and Goldthorpe and assumes that higher-grade managers, administrators and professionals together form a distinct, elite, class. Gouldner (1979: 19) defends this on the basis of their shared capacity to control knowledge, on the assumption that intellectuals and the intelligentsia are natural allies, and that they are able to appropriate privately larger shares of income produced by the cultures they possess (1979: 20). Goldthorpe (1982), on the other hand, sees the class commonality of his service class in the delegation of trust, which, in turn,

results in distinctive conditions of employment in terms of type and level of rewards. He argues explicitly that the difference between managers and professionals is only one of 'situs' position, not class (1982: 170). Furthermore, the role of the state as an employer is unimportant in the Goldthorpe framework, as it is also for Wright's new class map.⁶

If we except the Goldthorpe scheme (and its various applications) and the new Wright scheme, most recent stratification theory has focused only on the above-mentioned 'new class'. In Goldthorpe's larger class scheme, class II brings together both semi-professionals/technicians and lower-level managers; Wright's semi-credentialed group is more or less identical. Also, Goldthorpe's class III encompasses clerical and rank-and-file service workers. To Wright, all service workers are classified together with the 'manual proletariat', which, accordingly, becomes so huge (about 50 percent of the total labor force) that its analytical value is diminished.

Autonomy, human capital assets and the trust relationship are clearly important attributes that unite the 'new class'. But from our point of view there are other attributes which differentiate the scientists-professionals from the managers-administrators. The nature of their human capital and expertise directs them into very divergent kinds of productive (or unproductive) activity. The autonomy of the professional is of a qualitatively different kind than that of the manager, and what they control is not the same. Many professionals, such as engineers, may very well end up as corporate managers, but this will most likely entail a basic change in their working life, social identities, loyalties and functional tasks; hence, it should be regarded as a career, if not class, move. The manager and administrator is a hierarchical creature in the bureaucratic division of control and, as such, assumes authority over others, professionals often included. Outside the state, managers reflect a fordist logic of the division of labor.⁷

In contrast, the professional will usually stand outside the lines of command, possess a great deal of autonomy but probably little authority over subordinates; professionals' approach to work is task-oriented and their authority, legitimacy and collective identity are more likely to derive from the scientific standards of their chosen discipline, and not from bureaucratic office. The professional is, indeed, the antithesis to hierarchy and a fordist system of regulation. In sum, if scientific expertise is emerging as a new and dominant source of power, rewards and status identification that stands in contrast to traditional ones, the managers and professionals may be divided by more than 'situs' differences.⁸

A set of parallel principles can be applied also to the less exalted

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