


Aristotle's Concept of Chance

Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and Determinism



John Dudley

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CONCEPT OF CHANCE

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JOHN DUDLEY

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For Marcella, Anthony and Timothy

To be or not to be: that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them?

– Shakespeare, *Hamlet* III, i, 56-60

If Chance will have me king, why, Chance may crown me,
Without my stir.

– Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, I, iv, 144-5

Rendons au hasard ce qui est au hasard et à Dieu ce qui est à Dieu...
Ce que nous admirons par-dessus tout dans une rencontre du genre
de celle de Waterloo, c'est la prodigieuse habilité du hasard.

– Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, IIe partie, Livre I, XVI

Chance has an empire which reduces choice to a fool's illusion.

– George Eliot, *Middlemarch*, Book VII, Ch. 64

One's happiness must in some measure be always at the mercy of
chance.

– Jane Austen, *Sense and Sensibility*, Vol. II, Ch. 36

Multum cum in omnibus rebus tum in re militari potest fortuna.

– Julius Caesar, *De Bello Gallico* VI, xxx, 2

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PREFACE

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INTRODUCTION

– “A’s theory of chance and its implications have a fascination of their own, which must be my excuse for allowing them what some may consider disproportionate space.”

– W.K.C. GUTHRIE, *A History...VI*, 233-4

The topic of chance is one with which all human beings are confronted in day-to-day life. Everyone knows how it feels to have good luck and bad luck, and everyone attributes certain unexpected outcomes to chance. Chance is the spice of the plots of innumerable works of literature. At the level of techniques it is necessary to know about chance from a mathematical and statistical point of view, if one is in the business e.g. of gambling or insurance. Finally, scientists in many fields use the concepts of chance and probability, e.g. in physics, physiology, natural history, genetics, and evolutionary biology.¹ Thus chance is a topic of concern to man at many levels, as a day-to-day phenomenon, as a technique and in science. It is also a topic that has far-reaching implications, the depths of which can be analysed only by philosophy.

The importance of the topic of chance to the philosopher, apart from the intrinsic interest in analysing this highly complex concept, lies in the fact that chance has been invoked by many distinguished thinkers to explain the order in the universe, the origin of life as well as human freedom and happiness. These topics are, of course, among those of foremost concern to any philosopher. Aristotle deals with chance in the *Physics* as part of his study of causality and was clearly

¹ Cf. GIGERENZER, *The Empire of Chance...*

strongly motivated to study the topic by his concern to refute the attribution of the order in the universe to chance by Democritus.² In his ethical works he examines the extent to which chance plays a role in happiness. He does not accept that freedom is explicable by chance. In his biological works Aristotle also uses the concept of chance to explain the origin of some forms of life. In Chapter 9 of this study I shall suggest that Aristotle's analysis has lost none of its profundity in the light of the contemporary reference to chance.

In the history of philosophy numerous thinkers have given an account of the meaning of chance, and it is not possible in this volume to examine all of them.³ However, it may be said without oversimplification that six main views of chance have been held apart from that of Aristotle, which, as I hope will become clear, goes further than any of them.⁴ The first of these views is referred to by Aristotle at the start of *Phys.* II, iv. It is that of those who say that nothing happens by chance, but that there is a definite cause of everything we say happens by chance, i.e. chance is a misleading term conveying no content.⁵ This is the view held later by Francis Bacon, for whom chance is his prime example of the idols of the market-place (*idola fori*).⁶

² Cf. Aristotle's indignation in *Phys.* II, iv, 196 b 1-3 and the conclusion of *Phys.* II, vi.

³ For example, Hegel's interpretation of chance in terms of his philosophical system goes beyond the scope of this volume.

For the view of e.g. Albertus Magnus, cf. CIOFFARI, *Fortune and Fate*...92-103; VERBEKE, *Le hasard et la fortune*...

Cf. HERZOG-HAUSER, *Tyche*... for an overall view of the etymology of τύχη, τύχη as a mythical figure, τύχη in ancient epic and lyric poetry, in tragedy, comedy, rhetoric, history, novels, also for the cult of the goddess Τύχη, τύχη in art etc. Cf. further BERRY, *The History and Development of the Concept of ΘΕΙΑ ΜΟΙΡΑ and ΘΕΙΑ ΤΥΧΗ down to and including Plato*...; LASSEL, *De fortunae in Plutarchi operibus notione*; RÖSIGER, *Die Bedeutung der Tyche bei den späteren griechischen Historikern, besonders bei Demetrios von Phaleron*; RUHL, *Tyche*...; SCHLEMM, *De fontibus Plutarchi comm. de aud. poetis et de fortuna*; STROHM, *Tyche. Zur Schicksalsauffassung bei Pindar und den frühgriechischen Dichtern*.

⁴ SOONTIENS, *Evolutie*...10 lists eight meanings of chance in contemporary biology, which can, however, be grouped under the six more general interpretations now to be dealt with in the text.

⁵ For this view cf. further the Περί Τέχνης VI, 3-4 in the *Corpus Hippocraticum* discussed *infra* Ch. 5 n. 56.

⁶ *Novum Organon* I, lx.

The second view is that of the Presocratic universal determinists, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, who attributed certain necessarily caused occurrences to chance.⁷ They saw no contradiction in holding that a necessary event occurred by chance. Thus for them chance appears to refer to the subjectively unexpected nature of certain necessary events. This viewpoint will be examined in detail in Ch. 4(b).

The third view of chance stresses the unknown or unpredictable nature of the cause of a chance event. Thus Cicero writes: “Cum enim nihil sine causa fiat, hoc ipsum est fortuna, qui eventus obscura causa et latenter efficiat.”⁸ In modern times Voltaire writes that we have invented the term ‘chance’ to express the known effect of any unknown cause.⁹ Likewise, Bertrand Russell defined a chance event as one, the cause of which is unknown,¹⁰ while J.S. Mill held a chance event to be

⁷ The earliest expression tending towards this view is Archilochus (c.680-640BC), Fr. 8 Diehl: Πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα, Περικλεες, ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν. On this passage cf. BURIKS, *ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ*...10; WILAMOWITZ, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*...II, 300; JAEGER, *Paideia*...124-5; HERTER, *Glück und Verhängnis*...2. For an excellent commentary cf. BERRY, *The History and Development*...7-10. Cf. esp. *ib.* 9: “What does Archilochus mean by saying that it is *tyche* and *moira* who give men all things? His other statement, attributing all things to the gods, seems to indicate that he would not banish the Olympic gods from their position of power over men, but rather that he wishes to look at the problem of responsibility from a neutral viewpoint and to decide impartially just to what degree men determine their own destiny. The result of his quest is the statement here: *moira* (whether he means a θεόπεμπτος μοῖρα he will not say) and *tyche*, fortune, give men all things. He would not call either *tyche* or *moira* gods, since his characteristic contribution to the development is his idea that *tyche* and *moira* may well be elements not belonging at all to the sphere of the gods’ power, but rather impartial, neutral elements in man’s destiny and in happening; not θεοί but θεῖον in their power over mankind. They are both personified but not deified by Archilochus. The epic θεὸς καὶ μοῖρα becomes now to him τύχη καὶ μοῖρα...”

⁸ Cicero, *Top.* xvii, 63.

⁹ VOLTAIRE, *Le Philosophe Ignorant*, Ch. xiii: “...le hasard n’est rien. Nous avons inventé ce mot pour exprimer l’effet connu de toute cause inconnue.”

¹⁰ Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, *Reply to Criticisms*...738: “What do I mean by a ‘chance’ event? I mean one of which the causation is unknown.” For a more detailed account of Russell’s understanding of a chance event cf. SIDNEY HOOK, *Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of History*...672-4. Cf. p. 674: “Nor does it [Russell’s account of chance] breach the postulate of determinism. Chance events are not uncaused events but events relative to some determining strand or strands which they twist or snarl in ways that cannot be foretold by a consideration of the laws alone that describe earlier portions of the strands.”

the outcome of the concurrence of two independent causal chains.¹¹ Such definitions do not claim for chance a distinct ontological status, but distinguish chance events from others merely on the basis of their *de facto* unpredictability, not on the basis that they are uncaused.

The fourth view of chance is that referred to by Aristotle in *Phys.* II, iv, where he writes: “There are some who think that τύχη is a cause, on the one hand, but is unclear to the human mind, as if it were something divine (θεῖόν τι) and a mysterious power (δαιμονιώτερον).”¹²

¹¹ For Mill’s account of chance cf. MILL, *A System of Logic*...Book 3, Chapters XVII and XVIII, pp. 525-47, esp. 526: “Chance is usually spoken of in direct antithesis to law; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to any law, is attributed to chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens is the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been predicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from their laws.... An event occurring by chance, may be better described as a coincidence from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity... It is incorrect, then, to say that any phenomenon is produced by chance; but we may say that two or more phenomena are conjoined by chance, that they coexist or succeed one another only by chance; meaning that they are in no way related through causation...” Thus Mill appears to say that chance events could in theory be predicted because they are necessary outcomes, but cannot be predicted because there is no uniformity (i.e. no law) that makes it possible to link the necessary chains of causation that lead to a chance event. On Mill’s interpretation of chance, cf. HEATH, *On some Misconceptions*... Mill’s interpretation of chance is also that of MONOD, *Le hasard*...128 and others – cf. *Conclusion* of this volume n. 12.

Mill’s definition was already expressed in the fourth century by Themistius and Chalcidius. Cf. THEMISTIUS, *In Phys.* II, 56, 26-28: ὀρύξειε γὰρ ἂν τις θησαυρὸν εὐρήσειν ἐλπίζων, ἀλλ’ ὅταν τοῦτο ἐκείνου μὴ γένηται χάριν, ἀπαντήσῃ δὲ ἀλλήλοις καὶ οἷον συγκρούσῃ, ἢ τούτων συνδρομὴ τύχη καλεῖται. CHALCIDIUS, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentarius*...clix, also makes use of Aristotle’s example of the discovery of buried treasure and interprets it similarly. He defines chance as follows: “Quare sic etiam fortuna recte definiri potest: Fortuna est concursus simul cadentium causarum duarum originem ex proposito trahentium, ex quo concursu provenit aliquid praeter spem cum admiratione...” BOETHIUS, *De Consol. Philos.* V, 1 also uses the *concurus* to explain chance. Cf. *infra* n. 20. It should be noted, however, that for both Chalcidius and Boethius (for whom cf. *infra* p. 8) the *concurus* is subordinate to Divine Providence, whereas for Themistius there is no Divine Providence in the sense of an efficient cause – cf. GULDENTOPS, *Tyche Ontgoddelijkt*...326. ΚΑΪΑΝΤΟ, *Fortuna*...VIII, 193 incorrectly attributes the explanation by means of a *concurus* (later Mill’s interpretation) to Aristotle.

¹² *Phys.* II, iv, 196 b 6-7. This view was incorrectly ascribed to Democritus by CHERNISS, *Aristotle’s Criticism*...248. Cf. *infra* Ch. 2, n. 39.

Aristotle is referring here to Plato¹³ and to the traditional fifth-century religious view of chance found e.g. in Pindar, Aeschylus and other

¹³ For Plato's use of τύχη in this sense cf. *Resp.* IX, 592a θεία τύχη (the earliest appearance of the adjective θεία with τύχη in Plato); *Leg.* VI, 757e, 759c; VII, 798a θεία εὐτυχία; *Ep.* VII, 327e θεία τινὶ τύχη, 336e θεία τις τύχη, 337e; *Ep.* VIII, 353b; *Leg.* V, 732c-d; XII, 946b. Plato also used τύχη in the second and third meanings given above and with other prephilosophical meanings – cf. *infra* Ch. 4(b)(i). Aristotle (with the possible exception of Democritus – cf. *infra* Ch. 4(b)(ii)) was the first thinker to give a philosophical account of chance. Plato gave no definition or clarification of the meaning of the term (*Horoi* 411b 11-12 is spurious). The nearest he came is expressed in *Leg.* IV, 709b: Ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς, τὰνθρώπινα διακυβερνώσι σύμπαντα. ἡμερώτερον μὴν τρίτον συγχωρήσαι τοῦτοις δεῖν ἔπεσθαι τέχνην... The τύχη of 709d and 710c-d is, of course, also the τύχη referred to in 709b, likewise τύχη in *Resp.* VI, 499b, *Ep.* VII, 326a, 326e (providence – cf. ZIMMERMANN, *Tyche bei Platon...*91-3). BERRY, *The History and Development...*73-4 holds that τύχη and καιρὸς in 709b are distinct from θεός and definitely subordinated, and that τύχη is therefore “pure chance” and not θεία τύχη. However, it seems that τύχη is precisely θεία because it is subordinated. Cf. CIOFFARI, *Fortune and Fate...*42-3, BURIKS, *ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ...*51, and ZIMMERMANN, *Tyche bei Platon...*84-7. Cf. the implication that both τύχη and καιρὸς have a divine origin in *Leg.* III, 702b (cf. *Euthyd.* 272e κατὰ θεὸν γὰρ τινα ἔτυχον; cf. κατὰ θεὸν in *Leg.* III, 682e, *Resp.* IV, 443b, *Leg.* XII, 946b; IV, 722c), also *Ep.* VII, 327e, 340a εὐτυχῶς...θεόν; *Resp.* VI, 492a θεῶν τύχη.

On the expression τῆ θεία τύχη in *Leg.* VI, 759c cf. VAN CAMP and CANART, *Le sens...*363: “Θεῖος s’explique par θεῶ. Si tirer au sort revient à laisser le choix au dieu, c’est que le sort est ici le mode par excellence d’expression de la volonté du dieu, lui est parfaitement subordonné. Il n’y a plus hasard (τύχη) qu’en apparence. Platon revient sur ce point à l’ancienne notion de τύχη manifestation constante d’intervention divine.” On this passage cf. also BERRY, *The History and Development...*75: “...the feeling that by the use of the lot a problem was referred to divine guidance for solution was general in Greece; indeed this was the older attitude toward the lot, and its attribution to *tyche* seems to be a rather later development.” Cf. likewise *Leg.* VI, 757e – 758a (cf. *Leg.* III, 690c); *Leg.* XII, 945b (to be connected with 946b). A well-known later example is the selection of Matthias by lot (*Acts of the Apostles* 1, 24-26; cf. also Lk. 1, 9; I Sam. 14, 42 and many other passages). However, the casting of lots does not lead to the guidance of the chance outcome by Providence if the intention is lacking, as appears from *Resp.* V, 460a; X, 619d, 620c; cf. 604c-d; *Politicus* 300a; *Tim.* 18e (for a biblical example of the absence of Providence from the outcome of the casting of lots cf. Jn. 19, 24; Ps. 22,18).

On *Ep.* VII, 326b cf. VAN CAMP and CANART, *Le sens...*397: “...nous verrons donc ici dans θεία μοῖρα l’équivalent de la θεία τύχη qui revient fréquemment dans les *Lettres...* il faut y voir l’intervention de la divinité par le truchement des impressions humaines inexplicables, des faits contingents, du hasard. Θεῖος renvoie à cette divinité dont la nature n’est précisée nulle part avec exactitude.”

early writers.¹⁴ Aristotle's phrase would appear to refer to Plato's belief in both *θεία τύχη* and *δαιμονία τύχη*.¹⁵ According to this view, that

On *Ep.* VII, 327e cf. VAN CAMP and CANART, *Le sens...*398: "...il est très probable que *θεῖος* insinue...l'intervention d'une divinité dirigeant le cours des événements."

On *θεία τύχη* they conclude *ibid.* 403: "Un hasard qui a toutes les apparences et peut-être la réalité d'une providence, voilà la *θεία τύχη*, lorsqu'elle dépasse la portée d'une simple locution populaire."

On the providential background to *ἀγαθὴ τύχη* in Plato cf. *infra* Ch. 4, p. 158.

¹⁴ On Pindar and Aeschylus cf. BURIKS, *ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ*...6-14. This view was later adopted by the Stoics, who took it, however, in combination with the second view given above. On the Stoa cf. *infra* Ch. 4(b)(i). Cf. also SIMPLICIUS, *In Phys.*...333. However, Aristotle is not referring to Anaxagoras, as BURIKS, *ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ*, 59 rightly points out. ROSS, *Aristotle's Physics*...515 incorrectly thinks that the phrase *ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρώπινω λογισμῷ* may refer to Anaxagoras, as stated by Ps.-Plut. (Aët. I, 29, 7) and THEODORET, *Ἑλληνικῶν θεραπευτικῆ*...VI, 15. But it is rather the case that the phrase goes back to Aristotle, who first used it, and is not applicable to Anaxagoras. For an explanation cf. *infra* Ch. 2, n. 39. On chance in Anaxagoras cf. *infra* Ch. 4(b)(i), p. 137.

¹⁵ For *δαιμονία τύχη* in Plato cf. *Hipp. Maj.* 304c *δαιμονία τις τύχη*; *Tim.* 25e *δαιμονίως ἔκ τινος τύχης*, with which cf. *Euthydemus* 272d-e, 291a. *Tim.* 25e confirms the authenticity of *Hipp. Maj.* 304c. WILAMOWITZ, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*... II, 301 incorrectly denied the existence of *δαιμονία τύχη* in Plato.

On *Tim.* 25e cf. ZIMMERMANN, *Tyche bei Platon*...45-6: "Ihm [sc. Kritias] scheint bei der Erzählung irgendeine *τύχη* die Hand 'dämonischerweise' im Spiele gehabt zu haben. Es ist damit wieder der Zwischenbereich zwischen den menschlichen und göttlichen Kräften herangezogen und für diese unerklärliche, aber für das Dialogthema fruchtbare Tatsache verantwortlich gemacht. Man wird sich dabei genau-sogut der Daimonen und ihrer 'Mittel'-stellung, ebensogut auch des sokratischen Daimonions erinnern müssen, unter dessen Einfluß Sokrates handelt, wie auch der füngenden *τύχη*, die, wie in anderen Fällen, bei der Klärung von markanten Punkten innerhalb der platonischen Philosophie etwas glücklich fügt, wobei sie selbst in einem eigenartig unbestimmten Dunkel bleibt."

On *Hipp. Maj.* 304c cf. ZIMMERMANN, *Tyche bei Platon*...19: This *τύχη* is "eine unbestimmbare, innere, übermenschliche Kraft, die den Sokrates offensichtlich in ihrer Gewalt hat."

In *Leg.* IX, 877a 2-3 it also seems that the intending murderer's "not altogether bad luck" (*οὐ παντάπασι κακὴν τύχην*) is due to (although not synonymous with) the daimon that prevented him from succeeding, likewise 877a 5.

Cf. ZIMMERMANN, *Tyche bei Platon*...111: "Die 'dämonische Tyche' ist somit nicht als eine Antagonistin zu einer *θεία τύχη*, nicht als böses Prinzip im Widerstreit zu einem guten, zu fassen. Wie..., so kann auch das Verhalten der ambivalenten dämonischen Mächte bei der Verwirklichung von Gutem störend auftreten. Der Grund dafür ist, daß sie nicht reine Götter sind, sondern wie die Menschen mehr oder weniger mächtige Begierden haben."

which through lack of understanding is attributed to chance, has in fact a divine or supernatural cause. This view differs from the second view set out above by emphasizing, not the necessity of that which occurs by chance, but its divine or providential origin.¹⁶ It is also the view of St. Augustine, for whom the term ‘chance’ (*fortuna*) refers to an unknown cause, although there is a definite cause of everything said to occur by chance, namely divine providence.¹⁷

For τύχη as a superhuman evil force (fate) cf. *Ep.* VII, 337d. On this passage cf. ZIMMERMANN, *Tyche bei Platon*...97: “Es wäre damit der τύχη – wenigstens hier im 7. Brief einmal – ebenfalls eine bemerkenswerte dämonische Mittel- und Mittelstellung zugewiesen, in der sie offensichtlich die edelsten menschlichen Pläne durchkreuzt und für den Augenblick κακά hervorruft, und im ganzen lassen sich – wiewohl Platon sich selbst fragt, wem er den negativen Einfluß effektiv zuzuschreiben hat – der δαίμων τις, der ἀλιτήριός τις und die τύχη τις ἀνθρώπων κρείττων auf Grund ihres Wirkens parallelisieren.”

¹⁶ Cf. BURIKS, *ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ*...41: “Bij haar intrede in de historie is tyche een dienstmaagd der goden. Waar een daad, zwaar van gevolgen, staat te gebeuren, vertegenwoordigt zij de te hulp geroepen godheid. Haar komst is onverwacht en onberekenbaar als elke godsbeschikking, maar nimmer willekeurig. Slechts gaan de eeuwige wetten waaraan zij gehoorzaamt, menselijk begripsvermogen te boven. Zo vestigt haar optreden de indruk van regeloosheid.” Cf. also *ibid.* 111.

¹⁷ St. Aug. *Retractationes I De Academicis libri tres a 2*: “Sed in eisdem tribus libris meis non mihi placet *totiens me appellasse fortunam*, quamvis non aliquam deam voluerim hoc nomine intelligi, sed fortuitum rerum eventum vel in corporis nostri vel in externis bonis aut malis. Unde et illa verba sunt, quae nulla religio dicere prohibet: forte, forsan, forsitan, fortasse, fortuito, quod tamen totum ad divinam revocandum est providentiam. Hoc etiam ibi non tacui dicens: *Etenim fortasse quae vulgo fortuna nominatur, occulto quodam ordine regitur; nihilque aliud in rebus casum vocamus, nisi cuius ratio et causa secreta est.* Dixi quidem hoc; verumtamen penitet me sic illic nominasse fortunam, cum videam homines habere in pessima consuetudine, ubi dici debet: hoc Deus voluit, dicere: hoc voluit fortuna.” Cf. also *Quaest. In Hept.* I, 91: “...haec ipsa tamen, quae fortuita videntur, causis occultis divinitus dentur.”

For Aquinas *S.C.G.* III, 92 chance also refers to a cause unknown to man, which may be either an angel or God (divine providence). Cf. *S.T.* I, 103, 7 *ad 2*: “Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus per ordinem ad causas particulares extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, ‘nihil fit casu in mundo,’ ut Augustinus dicit.” [St. Aug. *De diversis quaestionibus* lxxxiii.24 *PL* 40, 17]. Cf. *S.T.* I, 116, 1: “Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem: quae est providentia divina.” Cf. *In Met.* 1216: “Relinquitur igitur quod omnia, quae hic fiunt, prout ad primam causam divinam referuntur, inveniuntur ordinata et non per accidens existere; licet per comparisonem ad alias causas per accidens esse inveniantur. Et propter hoc secundum fidem catholicam

For Chalcidius chance derives indirectly from God and Divine Providence. Thus the principal cause of fortune and chance is Fate,¹⁸ and Fate proceeds from Divine Providence.¹⁹ Likewise for Boethius chance (*fortuna*) is part of the causal order inaccessible to human reason. Fortune is controlled by Fate, which in turn is controlled by Providence.²⁰ Since all Fortune proceeds from Providence, Boethius interprets it in the Stoic manner as being good for man.²¹

Related to this standpoint is that of Simplicius,²² who approves the view of those who, in Aristotle's expression, think that "τύχη is a cause, on the one hand, but is unclear to the human mind, as if it were something divine and a mysterious power."²³ Simplicius deifies τύχη and sees it as the divine power that enables man and all things to attain or succeed (τυχεῖν). Τύχη is not only responsible when a man decides to go to the market-place and accidentally recovers his debt, but also

dicitur, quod nihil fit temere sive fortuito in mundo, et quod omnia subduntur divinae providentiae."

It may be noted, however, that in the parable of the good Samaritan Jesus uses the term 'chance', manifestly without any implication of divine providence (Lk 10, 31).

¹⁸ CHALCIDIUS, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentarius*...clxxix: "Ex hoc ordine rerum [sc. of Fate] demanant illa quae rari exempli sunt, quorum partim fortuna potestatem habet, partim improvisa et sua sponte proveniunt, quibus omnibus casus dicitur imperare." Thus Chalcidius substitutes fate, as the cause of chance, for Aristotle's intellect and nature. Cf. *ibid.* clviii: "Communiter ergo tam fortunam quam casum principali causae accidentes causas esse dicemus, ut sit causa quidem principalis in fato, in fortuna vero et casibus causa accidens."

¹⁹ CHALCIDIUS, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentarius*...cxliii. Chalcidius sums up his position *ibid.* clxxviii. On Proclus, for whom chance is part of the scheme of Fate, cf. CIOFFARI, *Fortune and Fate*...59-65. Cf. Proclus, *In Parm.* I, 664; *In Tim.* I, 197.28-198.15; *In Alc.* 124.10-12; 156.14; *In Remp.* II, p. 72.9-27 and 298.9-299.28; *Theol. Plat.* V, 9, 33.3-16; IV, 17. Cf. also LUNA and SEGONDS, *Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide*...248, n.4 (n. ad I, 664.9).

²⁰ Cf. *De Consol. Philos.* V, 1 *fin.*: "Licet igitur definire casum esse inopinatum, ex confluentibus causis, in his, quae ob aliquid geruntur, eventum. Concurrere vero atque confluere causas facit ordo ille inevitabili connexionem procedens, qui de Providentiae fonte descendens, cuncta suis locis temporibusque disponit." Cf. *De Consol. Philos.* IV, 11.

²¹ Cf. *De Consol. Philos.* IV, 13. For a detailed account of chance in Boethius cf. FRANKS, *The Fate of Fortune*...Ch. 3.

²² Simplicius sets out his view in *In Phys.* II, 356-361 (at the conclusion of his exegesis of *Phys.* II, iv-vi), cf. also 333.

²³ *In Phys.* II 359, 10-11.

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